## General

There’s a substitution effect. **Kopel 93**

\*\*Kopel is summarizing Kates and Benenson

David B. Kopel (American author, attorney, political science researcher, gun rights advocate, and contributing editor to several publications. He is currently Research Director of the Independence Institute in Golden, Colorado), Peril or Protection: The Risks and Benefits of Handgun Prohibition, Saint Louis University Public Law Review, Volume 12, 1993. NS

If handguns were somehow removed from the hands of malfeasants, would the death toll actually increase? Some gun misusers would switch to knives (not much less deadly than small handguns), while others would switch to rifles and shotguns (much more likely to kill than handguns). If enough misusers switched from handguns to long guns, the death toll might therefore increase, or so the "substitution argument" goes. Dixon confronts the substitution argument carefully, and provides one of the most comprehensive critiques of substitution theory ever offered by a handgun prohibitionist. \*327 Dixon is right to take the substitution argument seriously. While handgun wounds are usually survivable, especially if the victim gets medical attention quickly, shotgun blasts at close range are much more likely to be fatal. The shotgun fires a large slug, or from six to more than sixty pellets, with one trigger squeeze. A single shotgun pellet, because it may be of a diameter equal to a small handgun bullet, can inflict nearly as much damage as a small handgun bullet. [177] Wound ballistics and firearms experts concur that at short range, a shotgun is by far the deadliest weapon. [178] Anti-prohibition writers such as David Hardy, Gary Kleck, and Don Kates have argued that a high level of substitution of long guns for handguns would occur in the case of a hypothetical American handgun ban. Dixon offers a careful rebuttal of their arguments, and concludes that (since he has placed the burden of proof on prohibition opponents) the case for a substitution effect has not been proven convincingly enough to overcome what he considers the strong evidence for handgun prohibition. Overlooked in the discussion of a substitution effect resulting from a hypothetical American handgun ban is non- hypothetical evidence from other countries. As Dixon showed earlier in his article, countries with more handguns per capita tend to have more handgun homicides per capita. [179] Switzerland, which has, by world standards, relatively lenient handgun laws, has more handgun homicides per capita than countries where handgun laws are tougher. [180] From the handgun density/handgun homicide correlation in Switzerland and other nations (as well as from other evidence detailed supra), Dixon concludes that handgun density strictly correlates with handgun homicide. [181] Let us \* assume that Dixon is right. In countries such as Australia and Canada, where handgun laws are much stricter than in Switzerland, the handgun homicide rate is lower than in Switzerland, but the total homicide rate is over 100 percent greater. [182] The reason cannot be that Australians and Canadians are more prone to want to kill somebody than the Swiss are - Dixon has explicitly assumed that human nature in developed countries is roughly similar everywhere. [183] So why then do Canada and Australia have more murders, even though they have stricter handgun laws, and fewer handgun murders? One plausible explanation is the substitution effect. A sufficiently large number of Australians and Canadians, unable to obtain handguns, do their shooting with rifles or shotguns; their victims die, whereas if they had been shot with handguns, many would have survived. Although some Australian and Canadian assailants, unable to obtain handguns, switched to less deadly weapons (such as clubs), the number of assailants who switched to rifles and shotguns was sufficiently large to increase the overall death toll. If we have plausible evidence to suggest that a substitution effect may have occurred in Australia and Canada, could a similar effect occur in the United States? [184] \*329 Dixon quotes research developed by Don Kates and Mark Benenson that if 30% of persons attempting homicide switched from handguns to long guns, while the other 70% switched to knives, total homicide would increase substantially. If 50% switched to long guns, the homicide rate could double, even if none of the persons switching to knives killed anyone. [185] A National Institute of Justice study of felons in state prisons found that 72% of the handgun criminals said they would switch to sawed-off shotguns if handguns became unavailable. [186] A 72% substitution rate would lead to an enormous multiplication of the current homicide rate, and Kleck expects that substitution would occur at about 70%.

A handgun ban causes massive policing and incarceration of marginalized groups. **Gourevitch 15**

Alex Gourevitch [Brown University Assistant Professor of Political Science]. Gun control’s racist reality: The liberal argument against giving police more power. Salon. <http://www.salon.com/2015/06/24/gun_controls_racist_reality_the_liberal_argument_against_giving_police_more_power/> June 24, 2015. DD

The dead are buried, the murderer apprehended, and the shock has started to wear off. Now comes the public reaction to the massacre in Charleston. Soon after the shootings at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, the first black president of the United States offered some thoughts on Dylan Roof’s racist attack. First and foremost, President Obama said, recent events were about how “innocent people were killed in part because someone who wanted to inflict harm had no trouble getting their hand on a gun.” The killings were also about a “dark chapter in our history,” namely racial slavery and Jim Crow. Obama only suggested practical action regarding the first issue, namely gun control. He did not consider that such measures will make the persistence of the second problem even worse. It is perhaps counterintuitive to say so but gun control responses to mass killings – whether racially motivated or otherwise – are a deep mistake. The standard form of gun control means writing more criminal laws, creating new crimes, and therefore creating more criminals or more reasons for police to suspect people of crimes. More than that, it means creating yet more pretexts for a militarized police, full of racial and class prejudice, to overpolice. As multiple police killings of unarmed black men have reminded us, the police already operate with barely constrained force in poor, minority neighborhoods. From SWAT to stop-and-frisk to mass incarceration to parole monitoring, the police manage a panoply of programs that subject these populations to multiple layers of coercion and control. As a consequence, more than 7 million Americans are subject to some form of correctional control, an extremely disproportionate number of whom are poor and minority. While it is commonly assumed that the drug war is to blame for all this, work by scholars like Benjamin Levin and Jeff Fagan demonstrates that already existing gun control efforts also play an important role. One of the most notorious areas of policing, the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program, was justified as a gun control rather than a drug war measure. In the name of preventing violence, hundreds of thousands of poor minorities are subject to searches without probable cause each year. Further, a range of Supreme Court-authorized exceptions to standard Fourth Amendment protections against illegal search and seizure derive from a concern with gun violence. This invasiveness is a necessary feature of criminalized gun possession. After all, policing guns is just like policing drugs. Like drugs, there are a vast number of guns. Possession is far more widespread than can possibly be policed so decisions have to be made about where to devote resources. Furthermore, since possession itself is the crime, the only way to police that crime is to shift from actual harm to identifying and preventing risks. As legal scholar Benjamin Levin argues in a forthcoming piece “Searching for guns – like searching for drugs – can easily become pretextual, a proxy for some general prediction of risk, danger, or lawlessness.” In other words, there must be selective enforcement, where enforcement includes invasive searches based on existing prejudices about who is and isn’t dangerous. For example, as research by Jeff Fagan and Garth Davies shows, in the late 1990s, the NYPD used suspected weapons violations to justify numerous stops, even though these stops resulted in fewer arrests than stops for other crimes. And when it comes to individualized assessments of who is dangerous and worthy of punishment, every study shows steep, and unfounded, bias. Michelle Alexander, quotes a former U.S. attorney in her recent sensation, “The New Jim Crow,” saying the following: “I had an [assistant U.S. attorney who] wanted to drop the gun charge against the defendant [in a case which] there were no extenuating circumstances. I asked, ‘Why do you want to drop the gun offense?’ And he said, ‘He’s a rural guy and grew up on a farm. The gun he had with him was a rifle. He’s a good ol’ boy, and all good ol’ boys have rifles, and it’s not like he was a gun-toting drug dealer.’ But he was a gun-toting drug dealer, exactly.” This isn’t just a point about conscious and unconscious biases towards poor minorities – biases that some imagine can be removed with proper training. No matter how neutral the laws are, their enforcement must remain unequal and unfair. That is because the policing involved would never be tolerated if they affected politically influential groups to the same degree. These policing practices persist because they are disproportionately directed against marginal populations. Once individuals find themselves arrested gun control reappears as a reason for increasing punishment. Gun possession can be used to enhance sentences for other crimes and even functions as a kind of double punishment when that possession becomes the reason for also tacking on an extra criminal charge. Gun charges are also a part of the excessive and racially unequal over-charging practices that not only contribute to rising incarceration rates but also ends force numerous individuals away from trial and into plea bargains. Poor Blacks and Latinos are easily intimidated by charge-happy prosecutors into accepting plea deals, meaning they never see their day in court. Some even end up admitting to crimes they did not commit just to avoid the possibility of more severe punishments. More criminal gun laws would only feed this deeply unjust system.

No one will comply. **Kates 13**

Kates 13 (Don B, retired professor of constitutional and criminal law, research fellow with the Independent Institute, "Debate: Gun Control in the United States", 2013

It is safe to assume that most law-abiding gun owners would not comply with a firearms ban. That is verified by actual behavior. Despite often ferocious penalties, gun owners will not register their firearms because they fear this paves the way for eventual confiscation. In his book, [10] Prof. James B. Jacobs, Director of the Center for Research in Crime and Justice at New York University School of Law, noted that efforts to ban or register assault weapons are overwhelmingly ignored. In Boston and Cleveland, the rate of compliance is estimated at 1%. Out of the 100,000 to 300,000 assault rifles estimated to be in private hands in New Jersey, 947 were registered, an additional 888 rendered inoperable, and four turned over to authorities. In California, nearly 90% of the approximately 300,000 assault weapon owners did not register their weapons [8].

Review of literature proves statistics go neg. **Kates and Mauser 07**

(Don B. Kates (LL.B., Yale, 1966) is an American criminologist and constitutional lawyer associated with the Pacific Research Institute, Gary Mauser (Ph.D., University of California, Irvine, 1970), WOULD BANNING FIREARMS REDUCE MURDER AND SUICIDE?, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 30 No. 2], 2007. NS

In this connection, two recent studies are pertinent. In 2004, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences released its evaluation from a review of 253 journal articles, 99 books, 43 government publications, and some original empirical research. It failed to identify any gun control that had reduced violent crime, suicide, or gun accidents.15 The same conclusion was reached in 2003 by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control’s review of then-extant studies.16

The US doesn’t have the funding or infrastructure to enforce gun bans. **Vainik 06**

Vainik 06 Vainik, Jennifer L.[ J.D. Candidate 2008, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002, Northwestern] "Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang: How Current Approaches to Guns and Domestic Violence Fail to Save Women's Lives." Minn. L. Rev. 91 (2006): 1113. NS

Recent federal and state actions to disarm batterers are not saving women's lives. 125 Surprisingly, men appear to be experiencing the greatest benefit from recent domestic violence policies. 126 Since the 1970s, the number of men killed by their intimate partners decreased substantially while the number of women murdered in domestic violence incidents did not decline. 127 Recent changes that make it easier for women to escape violent relationships-such as the liberal issuance of restraining orders, 28 increased recognition of no-fault divorce, 29 and the proliferation of battered women's shelters 13 0 -likely account for the reduction in female-perpetrated homicides against intimate partners. Major flaws in federal and state approaches to disarming batterers cause women to continue to face deadly violence. At the state level, laws banning gun ownership by batterers are either non-existent or difficult to enforce. Overall, twenty-six states currently have no laws ordering batterers to disarm.' 3 ' In states that do have such laws, **conditions and qualifications reduce the likelihood of disarming batterers. For instance, a judge might decide that the gun removal provision "is not important" and refuse to impose the ban**.132 **If the batterer did not use the gun in the domestic violence incident, he might legally be able to continue to possess guns or purchase new ones.** 133 In many cases, the batterer may only be disarmed for a couple of days, 134 and, in states where the abuser must turn in his guns, he might simply refuse to comply. 135 **Even if states can legally disarm a batterer, many states lack the bureaucratic and physical infrastructure to actually remove the guns. Many states do not have gun repositories where the guns can be stored. 136 Nor do they have the extra law enforcement officers necessary to confiscate the weapons, catalogue them, store them in the repository, and return them once an order for protection terminates or a misdemeanant's record is expunged. 137 Some states have no system in place to inform victims, abusers, employers, and police officers of the gun bans.** 13s Other states do not have a common database wherein they may flag the abuser as a "prohibited person."' 39 Thus, gun dealers and police may not know whether an individual can or cannot possess or purchase a **gun. While the federal disarmament laws were enacted to ameliorate the inadequacies of the state** laws, the federal gun bans also fail to achieve their goal. The federal bans are severely underenforced, enabling batterers to continue to possess guns. From 2000 to 2002, 630 suspects were referred to U.S. Attorneys for violations of a firearms-related domestic offense, representing just three percent of the 18,653 federal suspects referred for alleged violent crimes. 140 This is a small fraction of the number of cases that can be prosecuted. Judge Posner of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit estimates that approximately **forty thousand people violate the gun bans each year by possessing firearms while subject to a protection order.**141 A much smaller percentage of suspects are actually convicted. 142 The federal time and money spent on enforcing weapons offenses is not commensurate to the scope of the problem. Additionally, Congress undermines the unique, national representative capacity of federal law. 194

Handgun bans strengthen organized crime through an illegal market. **Kopel 93**

David B. Kopel (American author, attorney, political science researcher, gun rights advocate, and contributing editor to several publications. He is currently Research Director of the Independence Institute in Golden, Colorado), Peril or Protection: The Risks and Benefits of Handgun Prohibition, Saint Louis University Public Law Review, Volume 12, 1993. NS

The inevitable black market in homemade and imported illegal handguns would provide a major new revenue source to organized crime. As the black market in alcohol helped create and enrich organized crime in the United States, the new black market in handguns would fund and strengthen organized crime all the more. Dixon also acknowledges that illegal handguns would also flow in across American borders. [130] Indeed, if small handguns were imported in the same physical volume as marijuana, 20 million would enter the country annually. (Current legal demand for new handguns is about 2.5 million a year). [131]

Hand guns are key to self defense and deterrence. **Kates and Mauser 07**

(Don B. Kates (LL.B., Yale, 1966) is an American criminologist and constitutional lawyer associated with the Pacific Research Institute, Gary Mauser (Ph.D., University of California, Irvine, 1970), WOULD BANNING FIREARMS REDUCE MURDER AND SUICIDE?, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 30 No. 2], 2007. NS

More than 100 million handguns are owned in the United States primarily for self-defense, and 3.5 million people have permits to carry concealed handguns for protection. Recent analysis reveals “a great deal of self-defensive use of firearms” in the United States, “in fact, more defensive gun uses [by victims] than crimes committed with firearms.”87 It is little wonder that the National Institute of Justice surveys among prison inmates find that large percentages report that their fear that a victim might be armed deterred them from confrontation crimes. “[T]he felons most frightened ‘about confronting an armed victim’ were those from states with the greatest relative number of privately owned firearms.” Conversely, robbery is highest in states that most restrict gun ownership.88 Concomitantly, a series of studies by John Lott and his coauthor David Mustard conclude that the issuance of millions of permits to carry concealed handguns is associated with drastic declines in American homicide rates.89

## A2 Cartels Adv

### Defense

Terminal D – the cartels don’t use handguns and they ship gun parts to be assembled in Mexico, not whole guns. **Schatz 16**

Bryan Schatz, How a Loophole in US Law Helps Drug Cartels Sneak Guns Into Mexico, Jan. 12, 2016

The cartels' weapons of choice are high-caliber rifles\*, as well as AR-15 and AK-47-type semiautomatic rifles, which can be easily converted into fully automatic machine guns. The cartel's gunrunners often buy firearms legally in the United States, either at gun shops, gun shows, or in private sales. The firearms are then illegally shipped across the border. But increasingly, the cartels are shipping weapons parts into Mexico to be assembled into finished firearms. It's a discreet process that is especially difficult to detect. Firearm manufacturers or importers in the United States are not required to stamp serial numbers on gun parts. Retailers do not have to report when they buy and sell parts kits with everything needed to complete a gun except a receiver. Receivers, which house the mechanical components of a firearm, like trigger groups and magazine feeds, can be purchased separately. To avoid detection, gunrunners will often use unfinished, or "80-percent" receivers—receivers that are mostly complete but require some further machining to be functional.

Administration crackdown has already eliminated the biggest cartel threats and ensured government stability. **Guerrero 14**

GUERRERO 14— (EDUARDO, “Yes: Violence and Murder Are Decreasing in Mexico,” Americas Quarterly, FALL 2014, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/yes-violence-and-murder-are-decreasing-mexico>).

When Mexican President Felipe Calderón left office in 2012, the nation’s war on the drug cartels had already claimed 60,000 lives. Now, two years into the presidency of his successor, Enrique Peña Nieto, security conditions are still far from praiseworthy, but have improved in several key areas.Homicides, the most reliable indicator for measuring public security in Mexico, have steadily decreased over the past two years. According to Mexico’s Insituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (National Institute of Statistics and Geography—INEGI) the number of murders decreased 13 percent between 2012 and 2013, and the homicide rate per 100,000 people declined from 22 to 19. Organized crime-related deaths have decreased even faster. According to the database of Lantia Consultores, a Mexico City-based public policy consulting firm, there were 1,956 organized crime-related deaths in the second quarter of 2014, down from a peak of 4,587 in the second quarter of 2011. The pace of the decline in organized crime-related deaths has been especially encouraging in two key metropolitan areas. In Ciudad Juárez, once known as the world’s most violent city, organized crime-related deaths have dropped from a peak of 787 during the third quarter of 2010 to 54 in the second quarter of 2014—a 93 percent drop. Likewise, in the Monterrey metropolitan area, Mexico’s industrial capital, murders in this category dropped from 472 in the first quarter of 2012 to 38 in the second quarter of 2014. The improvement in Monterrey seems to be the result of a thorough revamping of state and local police departments, which is largely the result of aggressive lobbying by the city’s powerful business community. This demonstrates the potential of local institution-building efforts in Mexico. Even the U.S. Department of State acknowledged as much in its August 2014 Mexico Travel Warning, which stated, “Security services in and around Monterrey are robust and have proven responsive and effective in combating violent crimes.”1 Moreover, over the past two years, peace has returned to cities throughout northern Mexico to an extent that seemed impossible between 2008 and 2012. High-profile attacks, shootings and roadblocks are less frequent. (One exception is Tamaulipas, which experienced a violent crisis as recently as last April.) Unfortunately, data for crimes other than homicide remain unreliable in Mexico. Thus, it is very hard to assess whether the downward trend in murders extends to other violent crimes, especially kidnapping and extortion, which are foremost concerns for Mexicans. The Peña Nieto administration has also recorded a number of important operational successes. The Zetas, a particularly violent cartel founded by defectors from elite military groups, have been nearly disbanded. (The decision to have federal forces target Zetas was taken at the end of the previous administration.) Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán—Mexico’s most notorious drug lord—was captured last February by Peña Nieto’s forces. His capture was skillfully executed and managed to avoid a violent conflict among factions of the Sinaloa Cartel. Some would argue that capturing such kingpins represents only a temporary setback to the cartels. However, such captures convey an important message: the Mexican state is only willing to tolerate so much violence or public notoriety, and it has the strength to prevail over drug lords. Arguably, Peña Nieto’s biggest victory thus far has been the successful operations in the state of Michoacán in early 2014, which dealt a significant blow to the Knights Templar—a drug cartel that had exercised virtually uncontested influence over political and economic activities in the state for the previous two years. Former Governor Fausto Vallejo and several mayors have acknowledged that the gang extorted protection money from almost all 113 municipal governments. A stream of recently released videos featuring mayors, state-level officials and even Vallejo’s son talking and drinking with the Knights Templar leader, Servando “La Tuta” Gómez, seem to confirm the cartel’s tight grip over local and state authorities. What made the Michoacán case particularly challenging was the emergence of armed self-defense groups in the Tierra Caliente region that organized to combat ever-increasing extortion by the Knights Templar. As the initial uprising rapidly expanded, a widespread civil conflict became a serious threat. The intervention of federal troops should have begun earlier, and was triggered only when self-defense groups were about to march on Apatzingán, the stronghold of the Knights Templar in the Tierra Caliente region, risking massive bloodshed. However, since the arrival of hundreds of federal forces in Michoacán last January, stability and security have improved. Organized crime-related deaths decreased 40 percent between the first and second quarters of 2014, and another large reduction is expected for the third quarter. Several Knights Templar leaders and some of their political associates have been arrested, avoiding an extensive witch hunt. In an effort to restore the rule of law, the federal government created the Comisión para la Seguridad y el Desarrollo Integral en el Estado de Michoacán (Commission for Security and Development in the State of Michoacán), which has displaced the state government as the key decision maker in the region. The Commission has brokered a ceasefire with most self-defense groups, many of which opted to join the ranks of a legal rural police.

Mexico doesn't get guns from the US and gun regulation alone won’t help since the military is weak. **Mauro 11**

Ryan Mauro, WHERE DRUG CARTELS REALLY GET THEIR ARMS, April 18, 2011

The Mexican government and the media have consistently blamed the U.S. for the vicious drug war in Mexico that has resulted in over 35,000 deaths since late 2006. A diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks will disappoint them, as it shows that 90 percent of the heavy weapons used by the drug cartels come from Central America. The strength of the drug cartels is more attributable to the Mexican government’s inefficiencies than America’s gun laws or consumption of narcotics. According to the published documents, U.S. diplomats in Mexico believe that these weapons, such as grenades and rocket launchers, are being stolen from the armed forces of Central American countries. They arrive in Mexico via the 577-mile Guatemalan border that only 125 Mexican immigration officials guard. Hezbollah and the Colombian FARC terrorist groups also deserve blame, as there are increasing indications that they are in bed with the drug cartels and are providing them with training, financing and possibly arms. Other cables show that U.S. diplomats are frustrated with Mexico’s handling of the drug war. The army is said to be so risk-averse that it declines to act on intelligence provided by the U.S. One document dated November 9, 2009 written by U.S. Ambassador Carlos Pascual says, “Mexico’s use of strategic and tactical intelligence is often fractured, ad hoc, and heavily reliant on the United States for leads and operations.” The responsibility for the failure to tame the escalating drug war lies with Mexico, as no U.S. gun restriction can disarm the drug lords when the Mexican army is unwilling or unable to fight. These documents are unlikely to stop the blaming of the U.S. for the war in Mexico. Secretary of State Clinton said on March 25, 2009, “Our insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug trade.” The media constantly cites the dubious claim 90 percent of the guns used by the drug lords come from the United States. This statistic comes from a report by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. It is based on the fact that, of the 29,000 guns seized in 2007 and 2008, 6,000 were sent to the U.S. for tracing. Of these, 90 percent were indeed found to have come from the U.S. But there is much more behind this fuzzy statistic.

Marijauna legalization is killing cartels now. **Ingraham 3/8**

Christopher Ingraham, Legal marijuana is finally doing what the drug war couldn’t, March 3, 2016

Legal marijuana may be doing at least one thing that a decades-long drug war couldn't: taking a bite out of Mexican drug cartels' profits. The latest data from the U.S. Border Patrol shows that last year, marijuana seizures along the southwest border tumbled to their lowest level in at least a decade. Agents snagged roughly 1.5 million pounds of marijuana at the border, down from a peak of nearly 4 million pounds in 2009. The data supports the many stories about the difficulties marijuana growers in Mexico face in light of increased competition from the north. As domestic marijuana production has ramped up in places such as California, Colorado and Washington, marijuana prices have fallen, especially at the bulk level. "Two or three years ago, a kilogram [2.2 pounds] of marijuana was worth $60 to $90," a Mexican marijuana grower told NPR news in December 2014. "But now they're paying us $30 to $40 a kilo. It's a big difference. If the U.S. continues to legalize pot, they'll run us into the ground." And it's not just price — Mexican growers are facing pressure on quality, too. "The quality of marijuana produced in Mexico and the Caribbean is thought to be inferior to the marijuana produced domestically in the United States or in Canada," the DEA wrote last year in its 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment. "Law enforcement reporting indicates that Mexican cartels are attempting to produce higher-quality marijuana to keep up with U.S. demand." If the decline in border seizures is any indication, however, it appears that Mexican growers are having difficulty competing with domestic production. Some federal authorities are beginning to believe this is the case. Noting the decline in border seizures, Michael Botticelli, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, told a Senate committee last year that "given the increase in marijuana use among the American population, this suggests that people using marijuana in the United States may be increasingly obtaining marijuana from domestic sources."

Crime and violence are effects of failed states, not causes. **Couch 12**

Neil Couch 12, Brigadier in the British Army, July 2012, “’Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?” <http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf/view>

A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16 Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18¶ A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse. Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either.19 One of the principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors.¶ This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure.

The USFG is the one supplying all the guns, not private owners. **Farago 15**

Robert Farago, 28k U.S. Assault Rifles Headed for Mexican Drug Cartels?, June 9, 2015

Mexico has purchased more than $1.15 billion in military equipment from the United States over the past 12 months. As the following article [via borderlandbeat.com] reports, “These sales do not include guns and ammunition. In 2014, the U.S. legally transferred more than 28,000 firearms to Mexico, most of them military rifles, at a value of $21.6 million. The year saw the most firearms sales in dollars of the 15 years that the U.S. Census Bureau has kept data.” Accountability? You must be joking. In fact, over the last ten years . . . thousands of U.S.-made rifles have “seeped” from the Mexican military to the drug cartels. More than 55k military-trained personnel defected to the cartels. Thousands more fully-automatic firearms simply went walkies from military and police arsenals. Not to mention the fact that the Mexican drug cartels have billions of dollars to spend on the tens of thousands of guns that the U.S. has sold or “donated” to South American countries over the last few decades. Or guns imported from China, Europe and elsewhere. When confiscated by the Mexican military, none of these official U.S. sales rifles are submitted to the ATF for trace. Why would they? They’re stamped with the original owner’s ID. Anyway, if just 10 percent of last year’s official U.S. rifle sales end up in cartels hands, a low-ball estimate, that’s 2800 box fresh guns. Remember: the U.S. is hardly the only country selling guns to the Mexican government, which quickly find their way into cartel hands. The feds would have you believe that Bob’s Gun Store is supplying the Mexican drug cartels with weaponry. The article tries to back that up with a University of San Diego study claiming 250k guns flow from the U.S. to Mexico illegally per year, I call bull. Our criminal neighbors to the South – which includes Mexican police and military – are awash in guns. Anyone who thinks that Uncle Sam isn’t the primary provider, one way or another, is failing to see the forest from the trees. Intentionally.

### A2 Hezbollah

Hezbollah is getting evicted from Latin America—no crime/terror connection anymore. **Algemeiner 15**

“Hezbollah’s ‘Golden Days’ in Latin America Coming to an End, Expert Says” http://www.algemeiner.com/2015/01/06/hezbollahs-golden-days-in-latin-america-coming-to-an-end-expert-says/

The rapidly changing diplomatic and political circumstances in Latin America mean that “Hezbollah’s golden days” in the region are coming to an end, an expert on the Lebanese Islamist terrorist organization has asserted.¶ Writing on the NOW-Lebanon website, journalist Ana Maria Luca observed that “things are changing drastically in the region. The late President Hugo Chavez, America’s most ostentatious enemy in the region, is gone. The times when Hezbollah members got Venezuelan papers to travel to the United States and Canada are probably over. Cuba — another country warmly disposed towards Iran, has recently seen an unprecedented thawing of relations with the US.”¶ Luca noted that Hezbollah was perturbed by the thawing of US-Cuba relations announced last month by President Obama. “This is how Hezbollah’s international relations official, Ammar Mousawi, congratulated Cuba,” she wrote. “‘The achievements of Cuba, which was firm in its principles, are a lesson for all peoples of the world who suffer from American hegemony,’ calling on the regime in Havana to ‘thwart the political, economic and military siege of Washington against Cuba for over half a century.’”¶ Luca’s observations were provoked by a report in the leading Brazilian daily, O Globo, which linked Hezbollah with Primer Commando de la Capital (PCC,) a criminal gang that operates across Brazil. “Intelligence services in Brazil believed that there were Hezbollah members in the country who were connected to Brazilian criminal gangs, providing weapons and explosives for the Brazilian criminals. In exchange, the Lebanese got protection for Lebanese inmates in PCC-controlled Brazilian prisons,” she said.¶ The revelation of Hezbollah’s Brazilian connection came on top of earlier investigations, reports and allegations of cooperation with the Mexican Los Zetas cartel, Luca said. “The documents, leaked by the Brazilian police to the press, show an interesting political shift in national and regional politics,” she asserted.¶ Hezbollah’s murky network in Latin America, which depends on friendly governments such as the leftist regimes in Venezuela and Bolivia, has been under scrutiny since 2006, when the US Treasury Department raised the matter with several Latin American governments. Almost ten years later, according to Luca, Hezbollah can no longer rely on intelligence agencies and police forces “turning a blind eye.”

Status quo solves Hezbollah—the conflict in Syria has overstretched them and will force military restraint. **Byman & Saab 15**

Daniel Byman, Research Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, Bilal Y. Saab, Resident Senior Fellow for Middle East Security, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, January 21, 2015, Brookings Institution, “Hezbollah Hesitates? The Group's Uncertain Transformation” http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2015/01/21-hezbollah-threat-byman-saab

Israel’s killing this week of six Hezbollah fighters and a top Iranian general in a helicopter raid in Syria is the latest and boldest attack by the Jewish state against the Shia party in recent years. Hezbollah has vowed to retaliate, and many of its supporters, urging the party to respond swiftly and forcefully, have advised Israel to “prepare its shelters.” If the three-decade history of confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah is any guide, the latter is likely to strike back to protect its credibility. But that is not inevitable. The Syrian conflict has transformed Hezbollah, arguably turning it into a more cautious foe of the Jewish state.¶ Hezbollah is a survivor. Since its formation in the early 1980s, the Shia party has made it through three high-intensity military conflicts with Israel, the assassination of several of its top leaders, the departure of its Syrian patron from Lebanon in 2005, and significant political crises in Beirut. Power, money, and performance, chiefly enabled by Iran and Syria, have allowed Hezbollah to become the dominant group in Lebanon and a key player in the high politics of the Middle East.¶ But the Syrian civil war is challenging Hezbollah’s domestic and regional position. If Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime falls, Hezbollah would lose a key supporter from a country that historically has played a dominant role in Lebanese politics. Even more important, Syria is Iran’s closest ally, and Tehran was calling in its chits by asking Hezbollah to close ranks around the Assad regime. Should Syria fall, Hezbollah could lose a storage facility and transit route for weapons from Iran and Syria to Lebanon. But should Assad leave, or his jihadist opponents grow stronger, the gravest threat Hezbollah (and Lebanon as a whole) would have to imminently deal with is Sunni extremism as represented by groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Sunni radicals would not settle for controlling Syria. They would also seek to expand into Lebanon to go after their number one bogeyman, Hezbollah. Already, Sunni jihadists have struck Hezbollah targets and the Iranian embassy in Lebanon, among other places.¶ By intervening in Syria to come to Assad’s aid, Hezbollah’s chief Hassan Nasrallah has put his party on a collision course with Syria’s (and many of the region’s) Sunnis—moderate and extremist alike. Indeed, despite Hezbollah’s military advances in Syria, Sunni militants have been able to penetrate deep into the Shia party’s sphere of influence and wreak havoc. More important, the same extremists that Nasrallah was hoping to fight outside Lebanon could turn Lebanon into another Iraq, a country defined by Sunni-Shia sectarian violence. Another Lebanese civil war would be a major distraction from the military struggle against Israel.¶ Hezbollah also risks military setbacks. Hezbollah has beaten back Israel’s military from Lebanon, earning it healthy respect from Israeli military leaders, something conspicuously lacking for other Arab military forces. At any given moment, there are perhaps 5,000 Hezbollah soldiers in Syria, but Hezbollah regularly rotates its forces to limit the impact. Even so, the strain is showing. Because of its heavy role in Syria, Hezbollah is more militarily invested in Iran than ever before. In Syria, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force assisted Hezbollah with command-and-control and training. Entering the war was in part payback for past favors, but the move tied Hezbollah even more tightly to its Iranian master. Finally, Hezbollah believes that it has a military role in Lebanon because of Syria. Along the border, its forces cooperate quietly with the Lebanese Armed Forces, patrolling and even laying mines to prevent infiltration.¶ Hezbollah is both battle weary and battle hardened. The Syria experience has bloodied its forces, making them more skilled and allowing Hezbollah to test its commanders. At the same time, the heavy death toll and the constant strain are overwhelming, and Hezbollah could not easily take on a new foe. The fighting in Syria is also different from fighting Israel: Hezbollah is, in essence, a counterinsurgency force, taking on less-organized, poorly trained, and lightly-armed rebels. The Israel Defense Forces are a different, and far more dangerous, kettle of fish.¶ As a result, Hezbollah’s military threat to Israel is uncertain. The growing range of Hezbollah’s rockets puts all of Israel in danger, although the success of the “Iron Dome” missile defense system offers Israelis some comfort. Nevertheless, Hezbollah is in no mood for an all-out war with Israel. The memories of the disastrous 2006 conflict are still fresh, and the drain of the Syrian conflict makes Hezbollah even more cautious. Although Israel likewise has no interest in a broad fight, conflict might break out depending on how Hezbollah chooses to respond to Israel’s latest deadly assault.¶ Despite Hezbollah’s role in terrorism, the United States and Hezbollah currently share many interests—a reality both sides hate and would deny. Yet both are at war with ISIS, and both want to prop up Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar Abadi’s government in Baghdad. Even within Lebanon, although Washington supports Hezbollah’s weak political rivals, it recognizes that Hezbollah is helping hold the country together and that an ISIS expansion or a descent into chaos would be a nightmare.¶ A slight shift could turn suspicion into conflict. U.S. military actions in Syria are focused on ISIS and thus are indirectly helping the Assad regime, Hezbollah’s ally. Yet if Washington decides to live up to its anti-Assad rhetoric and take on the Syrian regime as well as ISIS, it will also be taking on Hezbollah. Similarly, Hezbollah is more in bed with Iran now than ever before, and any military action against Tehran over its nuclear program must factor in the Hezbollah response.¶ Hezbollah remains a potent regional actor: a stalking horse for Iran, and a prop to the Syrian regime. Nevertheless, the organization is also overtaxed militarily and on the defensive politically. Therefore, as painful as the loss it has just suffered is, it wouldn’t be shocking if Hezbollah decided to hold fire, or at least limit its response.

## A2 Soft Power Adv

### Defense

The notion of soft power fails – empirics and new challengers prove. **Morici 14**

Peter Morici professor at the Robert H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland, is a recognized expert on economic policy and international economics (Peter, “Soft Power and the Failure of U.S. Foreign Policy,” Epoch Times, 6/21/2014, <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/752412-soft-power-and-the-failure-of-u-s-foreign-policy/>) //RGP

U.S. foreign policy is failing. Russia is pushing into Ukraine and threatening Eastern Europe; China is bullying Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam in the East and South China seas; and terrorist groups in the Middle East and Africa are displaced from one place, only to multiply and create more lethal threats in others. Since the end of the Cold War, both Democratic and Republican administrations have in varying measure premised policy on the notion that economic incentives and other soft power can cultivate peaceable democracies throughout the world and friendly societies adhering to Western liberal values. The United States and Western Europe have offered China, Russia, and developing countries access to markets, investment, foreign aid, and technical cooperation, but, in many places, those have yielded few results other than to finance threats to our common security. China remains an authoritarian regime led by an oligarchy—the Communist Party—with a poor human rights record. Its superior economic performance, greatly assisted by trade with the United States, and the material gains enjoyed by its citizens virtually ensure the Party’s continued grip on power. Beijing, however, sees American influence in the western Pacific as a threat and is actively challenging U.S. naval superiority. Russia President Vladimir Putin and his loose coalition of oligarchs appear to be more interested in restoring a lost empire and amassing wealth at the top than genuinely improving the lot of ordinary citizens**.** They are happy to sell natural gas to Europe to finance those ambitions, but don’t count on international commerce to make Russia a benign actor. If the United States doesn’t match China’s navy and Russia’s army with resources and forceful actions when challenged, those rivals will prevail in their regional ambitions. Still President Obama is correct to warn flexing military muscle is not a stabilizing solution everywhere, especially the Middle East and Africa. Perhaps Iraq best epitomizes the dilemmas terrorism poses. If the United States provides air support or puts troops on the ground to defend Baghdad, it may halt the advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but it can’t defeat it. The ISIS is a curious hybrid of a terror organization and a brutal organized army that can hold territory and potentially topple a government, but does not regularly mass forces that can be destroyed in the field by a Western army. If stymied, its fighters will simply move to other conflicts, like the civil war in Syria. Western democracies long ago assigned religion a subordinate role. The state claims sovereignty from citizen consent, not by appealing to divine right. For many Muslims, religion and state legitimacy are inseparable, and throughout the Middle East and Africa, many are willing to die to destroy democratic governments that could subordinate the authority of Islam to secular governments. And ethnic rivalries are often cast in terms of religion**.** Without democratic institutions that place individual freedoms above religion, it is hard to see how competing claims of historically conflicting ethnic groups can be resolved and civil wars ended, and animus toward the West and acts of terror stopped. Neither economic engagement by the West nor American foreign aid can change those facts on the ground. Radical Islam is premised on widely held ideas, and ideas are tough to destroy with armies. In the end, the United States must recognize it is in for a long slog fighting terrorism in the Middle East and Africa**.** No amount of national building and economic aid will change that, but sometimes it can make matters worse. Sadly, armies and navies still trump economics. Americans will have to pay the price or face menacing threats to their security at home and interests abroad**.**

US soft power is resilient. **Cox 12**

Cox, 2012 (Michael, Professor IR London School of Economics, December, “Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?” International Relations, Vol 26 No 4, p 369-388, SagePub)

If China has a real problem in projecting a positive and confident picture of itself or of the world it would like to build, the same can hardly be said of the United States. 92 The US may have lost good deal of standing in the world because of the Iraq War; meanwhile the West has clearly suffered a setback because of the economic crisis. However, the first was partially vitiated by the election of Obama in 2008, and the second has not led to anybody serious proposing an alternative. Moreover, the ‘West’ for all its faults – growing inequality, ethical standards in decline and all the rest – still looks a more attractive proposition than anything else on offer. As a recent study has shown, ‘soft power’ is almost entirely the preserve of Western, or more precisely democratic, countries with the United States still leading a league table that includes most West European countries as well as two countries from Asia – Japan and South Korea. China on the other hand comes in 20th, just ahead of Brazil at 21st, followed by India at 27th and Russia 28th out of a total of 30 countries assessed. 93 There are several reasons why the West continues to score well in terms of soft power, the most obvious being that Western countries have a pluralist political culture where having dissident views, will not, by and large, end up with one spending a rather long term in priso**n** or worse. But another reason – clearly connected – has to do with its open system of higher education. Here, even the much-maligned United States continues to have great magnetic pull, nowhere more so than in China itself, judging by the enormous number of Chinese students who every year seek a place in US institutions of higher learning. Many of them may in the end return to China. However, they clearly believe that getting an education in a US college will improve their job prospects in an increasingly tough Chinese job market. 94 Nor is this temporary ‘brain drain’ a mere accident of history. Indeed, one of the more obvious signs of continued Western and American strength is its university sector. 95 Other countries and continents obviously have universities. But very few of them rank especially high in international terms. 96 The BRIC countries in particular seem to face almost insuperable difficulties in raising standards. Brazil and India for example have no universities in the top 100, Russia only one and China a mere five – three of these being in Hong Kong. The United States, in 2011, meanwhile remained home to 8 of the top 10 ranked universities in the world, 37 of the top 50 and 58 of the top 100. Even the United Kingdom does well, having 17 ranked universities compared to a total of 13 in the whole of Asia. 97

### DA – Middle East

Negotiations for a two-state solution in the Middle East have failed because of ineffective diplomacy – a one state solution is key to regional stability. **Leverett 14**

Leverett and Leverett 14 – Flynt Leverett, professor of international affairs and law at Penn State, senior fellow at the New America Foundation, former senior director for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council, Ph.D. from Princeton University, Hillary Mann Leverett, senior professorial lecturer at American University’s School of International Service, J.D. from Harvard University, 2014 (“The Two-State Solution Is Dead,” The National Interest, July 12th, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-two-state-solution-dead-10862?page=1> | ADM)

Secretary of State John Kerry’s failed efforts to broker an Israeli-Palestinian “final status” deal highlight American foreign policy elites’ instrumental attachment to a negotiated “two-state” solution as the only acceptable basis for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel’s ongoing assault on Gaza, though, underscores a fundamentally different reality: the two-state solution is dead. And no matter how much Israel and its supporters object, the reigning paradigm for addressing the conflict is shifting ineluctably from a two-state model to a one-state model. The two-state solution is the illusory end product of a U.S.-conceived “peace process” that has always been about things other than actually achieving peace—just as, contrary to the conventional trope, the U.S.-Israeli “special relationship” is not really about “shared values.” From Israel’s declaration of independence in 1948 to 1967—when memories of the Holocaust were fresh and Israel was arguably at its most democratic—America provided it no appreciable military or economic assistance; indeed, Washington barely gave it food aid. During the same period, there was plenty of fighting between Israel and various Arab parties—yet America did not initiate any kind of “peace process.” Washington only began providing substantial military and economic assistance to Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when Israel showed itself capable of unilaterally defeating and seizing territory from Arab states allied with Moscow. From Washington’s perspective, supporting an Israeli military that would periodically show up Soviet-supplied Arab opponents was, in a Cold War context, strategically valuable. After the Cold War’s end, U.S. policymakers continued calculating that U.S.-facilitated Israeli military superiority helped keep the region subordinated. Likewise, Washington only launched a “peace process” after 1967, to elicit Arab states’ buy-in for what were going to be ever-increasing flows of U.S. weapons and money to Israel’s military. The process was never meant to constrain Israel and help Palestinians exercise their right to self-determination as part of genuine conflict resolution; it has always been about empowering Israel and subordinating Palestinians and other Arabs as part of an increasingly militarized U.S. sphere of influence in the Middle East. - In its first proposals, Washington suggested in 1969 that Israel return some of the territories it had conquered to Arab states—but not to Palestinians. - Henry Kissinger’s 1974-1975 “shuttle diplomacy” sought to give Saudi Arabia political space to break with the oil embargo imposed in 1973 by key members of OPEC. - To facilitate Egypt’s transformation into a subordinated American “partner,” the 1978 U.S.-brokered Camp David Accords posited a self-governing administrative council for Palestinians, with some recognition of their “legitimate” (but not political) rights. - As the Cold War ended, Washington was challenged to appear more forthcoming on the Palestinian issue to maintain Arab state buy-in to a heavily militarized, U.S.-led political and security order in the Middle East. So, at the 1991 Madrid Conference, America brought Palestinian representatives into the “peace process” for the first time. Two years later, with tens of thousands of U.S. troops still deployed in the region after the first Persian Gulf War, the 1993 Oslo Accords held out the prospect of a self-governing—but not sovereign—“authority” in parts of the West Bank and Gaza, with some recognition of Palestinians’ “legitimate and political rights.” - President George W. Bush’s 2003 “Roadmap” finally proposed two states,” Israel and Palestine, “living side by side in peace and security”—but neither his administration nor his successor’s made appreciable progress toward this goal. (While the Obama administration also endorsed the two-state model, if it were serious about “peace” and helping the parties achieve their rights, it would not be using every lever at its disposal to block Palestinian membership in international institutions and access to the International Criminal Court; it would instead be leading the charge.) As Washington’s “peace process” strategy has become harder and harder to sustain, U.S. officials have hid behind pious claims that America can’t want peace more than the parties. In reality, though, Washington is the only party that truly wants the “peace process.” Certainly Israel has never wanted it; Golda Meir’s “leftwing” Labor government rejected Washington’s first peace plan in 1969. Palestinians, for their part, have never come together to accept a “process” meant to deprive them permanently of genuine sovereignty and self-determination. The two-state solution’s demise inevitably conditions long-term erosion in the perceived legitimacy of the current Israeli political order. The proposition that Israel cannot continue occupying Palestinians while claiming to be both Zionist and democratic is no longer predictive analysis. The U.S. government’s own demographic data show that the number of Arabs living under Israeli control—in “Green Line” Israel, Gaza, the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem, and the rest of the West Bank—already exceeds the number of Israeli Jews. In other words, what we call the state of Israel is already a minority regime for the people it governs. In the context of the current Gaza campaign, Israeli officials’ descriptions of Hamas as a foreign threat that must be defended against are disingenuous. Hamas is a homegrown movement, born in 1988 in Gaza under Israeli occupation. Even with the 2005 closure of Israeli settlements there, Gaza remains under Israeli control. Thus, Hamas is not an “external” threat to Israel—it is an internal challenge to what the movement’s constituents see as an unjust and illegitimate political order still dictating their interactions with the world and exercising harsh and indiscriminate police powers over their daily lives. This leaves the one-state option—some version of one person, one vote for people living under Israeli control. For the foreseeable future, the one-state model will be opposed by the overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews and supporters of Israel. It will also threaten current regional governments—e.g., in Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia—that have bought into Washington’s vision for a U.S.-led political and security order in the Middle East that includes nearly absolute freedom of unilateral military initiative for Israel. But other important actors—Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and any other regional state where government becomes more representative—would support it. A one-state scenario has profound implications for America’s position in the Middle East. For the United States to “lose” Israel as a proxy for projecting hard power would severely circumscribe Washington’s capacity to keep its Middle East strategy oriented toward regional dominance. It would instead push Washington toward a strategy of stabilizing the regional balance through serious diplomatic engagement with all relevant players (Iran as well as Israel and Saudi Arabia). This is a radically different approach from the one envisioned by U.S. policymakers during the Cold War and pursued in relatively unconstrained fashion by U.S. administrations after the Cold War’s end, entailing a highly militarized U.S. presence and American micromanagement of regional political outcomes. Given the deeply counterproductive results of America’s Middle East strategy over the last quarter century, one may hope that Washington will finally stop making policy in defiance of on-the-ground reality. In the near-to-medium term, though, American politicians and policymakers are more likely to continue doubling down on the sorts of policies—including ever-increasing military assistance for Israel—that have put the United States on a trajectory of ever-declining influence in one of the world’s most strategically vital regions.

Increased soft power boosts public diplomacy for a two-state solution. **Hirschfield 14**

Hirschfield et al 14 – Yair Hirschfield, Isaac and Mildred Brochstein Fellow in Middle East Peace and Security in Honor of Yitzhak Rabin at the Baker Institute, teaching at the University of Haifa in the Department of Middle Eastern History, director general of the Tel Aviv-based Economic Cooperation Foundation, Ph.D., Samih Al-Abid, Diana Tamari Sabbagh Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies at the Baker Institute, Baker Institute Israeli-Palestinian Working Group, Ph.D., Edward P. Djerejian, founding director of Rice University's Baker Institute, nominated by President Clinton as U.S. ambassador to Israel, 2014 (“Changing Minds, Making Peace: U.S. Public Diplomacy And The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Baker Institute, Rice University, p. 23, July 7th, <http://bakerinstitute.tendenciapp.com/research/changing-minds-making-peace-us-public-diplomacy-strategy-support-israeli-palestinian-two-state-solut/>, PDF | ADM)

The end of the most recent round of direct negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians has increased the need for unofficial channels of dialogue between the parties. Leaders on both sides are currently considering unilateral actions that prioritize domestic political concerns at the expense of a negotiated solution. Nonetheless, broad segments within both the Israeli and Palestinian public continue to view the model of “two states for two people” as the only acceptable framework for resolving the conflict. Given the disconnect between the preferred endgame and the lack of confidence that such an outcome is currently attainable, the role of the U.S. and its partners should not be to force Israelis and Palestinians into an arrangement neither side desires. Rather, the current pause in direct negotiations should be used to implement an enhanced soft power campaign targeting key public diplomacy goals. Three of these goals—engaging and understanding public opinion, providing information to both sides on the benefits of peace, and educating and promoting the values and principles of U.S. involvement in the conflict—are central to existing public diplomacy work in Israel and Palestine and should be enhanced. This report concludes that a fourth goal—promoting potential mechanisms for a sustainable agreement—is necessary to connect public diplomacy efforts to policy formulation, shape a more positive environment for negotiations, and increase the likelihood of Israelis and Palestinians working bilaterally toward peace with the assistance of the U.S. and international partners. As an initial framework to pursue this goal, this paper presented five bottom-up strategies for conflict transformation: identifying peace as a national security interest; conveying flexibility in third-party framework positions; mobilizing regional and international support; and expanding government-to- government and people-to-people interaction. The power of public diplomacy lies in the ability to build networks that support values and principles in order to shape opinions toward policy. In the case of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, public diplomacy is a valuable tool for listening to opinions on the ground and communicating U.S. interests. However, the dramatic increase in the region’s youth populations and connectivity that catalyzed the Arab Spring have also created new demands for public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East. Strengthening public diplomacy efforts and connecting public diplomacy programs to U.S. policies toward Israeli- Palestinian negotiations are essential steps in increasing the reach and impact of the U.S. role in resolving the conflict.

A “two-state” approach forces Israeli and Palestinian strikes that cause terrorism and nuke war. **Beres 01**

Beres 1 – Louis Rene Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue, holds a PhD from Princeton University (“The Risks of a Palestinian State,” The Jerusalem Post, October 16th, <http://www.freeman.org/m_online/nov01/beres1.htm>)

A Palestinian state should not be foolishly supported by the US for immediate and short-term needs. Because the creation of a State of Palestine alongside the State of Israel will heighten the risk of regional nuclear war considerably, this newest enemy state should be viewed with real apprehension. Indeed, it's creation could likely be a final step to bring an Islamic "Final Solution" to the region. Architects of the Oslo Accords suggested all along that a "two-state solution" to the Palestinian problem would substantially reduce the risk of another major war in the Middle East. But as we should have learned by now, especially from recurring Arab violations of the "peace process," the conventional Oslo wisdom was always unwise. For the most part, Iranian and Arab state inclinations to war against Israel have had absolutely nothing to do with the Palestinians. Even if Israel continued to make all unilateral Oslo concessions, and continued to adhere to unreciprocated agreements, these belligerent inclinations would continue, especially from Syria, Iraq and Libya, as well as from Iran and Egypt. When Israel soon faces a new state of Palestine, the Jewish state's vulnerability to armed attack by hostile neighbors will increase markedly. If this diminished safety is accompanied by the spread of unconventional weapons to hostile states, which now seems certain, Israel could find itself confronting not only war, but genocide. Why?, the new State of Palestine will preoccupy Israeli military forces to a much greater extent - much, much greater than does the intifada. Even if it were able to resist takeover by one of the other Islamic states in the region, Palestine will surely become a favored launching-point for renewed terrorism against Israel. Various promises notwithstanding, Islamic insurgents would continue to celebrate violence against Israel as the essence Most importantly of "national liberation." Recognizing an "improved" configuration of forces vis-a-vis Israel, a larger number of Islamic enemy states will calculate that they now confront a smaller, more beleaguered adversary. Further, they will understand that a coordinated effort by certain countries that possess or are in the process of acquiring pertinent ballistic missiles could possibly endanger Israel's very survival. Taken together with the fact that global support for Israel is always fickle, especially in perilous times such as these, and that individual or combined chemical/biological/nuclear warfare capabilities could bring enormous harm to Israel, the creation of Palestine will tip the balance of power in the Middle East decisively. THE FULL strategic implications for Israel of an independent Palestine should now be carefully appraised. If, in the end, such independence becomes the cause of a nuclear war in the region, everyone, Palestinians as well as Jews, will lose. But how, exactly, would a nuclear war begin in the reconfigured Middle East? One possibility would be by Arab or Iranian first strikes against Israel. These strikes could be nuclear (although this would likely be several years away) or non-nuclear. In either scenario, Israel - especially if it feels dangerously close to defeat - might resort to nuclear retaliation. Alternatively, Israel, believing that substantial enemy attack - chemical, biological, conventional, or nuclear - is imminent, could decide to act preemptively. If, as we might expect, this preemption were entirely non- nuclear, it could still fail to prevent the anticipated attack against Israel. Here, Israeli nuclear weapons, having failed in their mission to support conventional preemption by deterring enemy retaliation, might also have to be used for purposes of nuclear war fighting. Israel has much to fear - more perhaps than any other state on the face of the earth. Threatened by a growing number of adversaries with ballistic missiles and with a corollary interest in nuclear warheads, Jerusalem should know that full and codified transformation of Judea/Samaria and Gaza into Palestine will provide its enemies with the means and the incentives to destroy the Jewish state once and for all. Deprived of essential "strategic depth," and beset internally with hostile Arab citizens loyal only to "Palestine," Israel will become seriously vulnerable to total defeat. Anguished by a possible end to the Third Temple Commonwealth, the nation's leaders will begin to think seriously about nuclear weapons as a last resort (the so-called "Samson Option"). It follows that Bush's October 2 endorsement of a Palestinian state should be viewed with the most grave concern. Otherwise, Palestine, looking first very much like Lebanon, will wind up as Armageddon.

### DA – Terrorism

US soft power incites terrorism and war. **Matalin 09**

John Matalin (CNN Commentator) 2009 “Matalin: Obama’s ’soft power’ makes us weak”, CNN's American Morning

John Roberts: The former vice president has said several times that the Obama administration’s policies are making America less safe. Where’s the evidence for that? Mary Matalin: Common sense and history… It’s one thing to say all of the things Obama said on the campaign trail but within hours of being the actual commander in chief, he was suggesting the previous seven years marked by no attacks were policies that were ineffective, were immoral, were illegal. That broadcast to our enemies a weakness. Weakness invites provocation. Secondly, as he was clear in his speech yesterday, he wants to return to a 9/10 law enforcement policy rather than a prevention policy. Three, the threshold and key tool for fighting this enemy is gathering intelligence. And he’s clearly demoralized and undermined those intelligence gatherers. Four, Gitmo, releasing the hardest of the hardened terrorists into some system, whatever system that might be, either would divulge classified material… if they put them in the prison population, they can hatch plots as was the case in New York. So I could go on and on. But some of these policies, by virtue of the former vice president speaking out, were stopped as in the release of the detainee photos. Roberts: But is there any empirical evidence that America is less safe today? Has anything happened around the world to suggest that we are less safe? There are many people who believe that this administration’s policy of engagement, in fact, will make this country more safe. Matalin: Well there’s no evidence of that either. In fact there’s evidence to the contrary. This so-called “soft power” has resulted in Iran being more verbose, launching a missile this week. North Korea’s pulled out of any negotiating posture. Soft power isn’t working. There’s no evidence for that. And there’s plenty of evidence to the contrary that weakness invites provocation. During the ’90s, when we did not respond to six attacks in six years, the ranks of al Qaeda swelled by some 20,000. That was the recruitment tool. Weakness and successful attacks is the recruitment tool. Roberts: Just to go back to what you said about Iran and North Korea — both of those countries did exactly the same thing during the Bush administration. Matalin: This supposedly “let’s sit down and talk,” was supposed to make them come to the table and talk. In fact, they’ve gotten more aggressive. So, he’s doing what he said he would do, which would render them putty in his hands as he thinks is the case as sometimes appears to be the case in America in his own party. That’s not what’s happening. That’s not real politics. So he’s been in there a couple of 16 weeks, three months, whatever it’s been. But if he were allowed to pursue un-debated, these sorts of policies that he’s put on the table and heretofore, they have been un-debated, it’s been a one-sided argument, there’s no doubt, and history shows and common sense would dictate that we would be a less safe country than we were for the past seven or eight years. Roberts: The president said yesterday he believes America is less safe because of the very existence of Guantanamo Bay, that it’s probably created more terrorists worldwide than it’s ever detained. Do you agree with that statement? Because the Bush administration, President Bush said he would like to close Guantanamo and just has to figure out how to do it. Matalin: Yeah, John, I’ll go to your construct. He offered no evidence for that. And it’s a tautological argument, as I just noted. The ranks of al Qaeda were absolutely exponentially swollen during the ’90s when we did not respond… This enemy existed way before Guantanamo. It makes no sense to say that fighting the terrorists makes the terrorist. That’s a tautological argument. Yes, President Bush wanted to close it. Some of us disagreed with that. For the very reasons we’re disagreeing with President Obama right now.vWhat are you going to do with these detainees? Even the ones that have been released, which were supposed to be the ones that could have been released, the D.O.D. and some suspect this is an under-estimate – one out of seven go back to the battlefield. The top operatives in Yemen, which is the new hot grounds, the top operatives in Waziristan, were released from Gitmo. It’s not good to close it down or release these into our population, certainly, or any population.

Terrorism causes extinction. **Myhrvold 14**

Myhrvold 14 (Nathan P [chief executive and founder of Intellectual Ventures and a former chief technology officer at Microsoft]; Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action; cco.dodlive.mil/files/2014/04/Strategic\_Terrorism\_corrected\_II.pdf; kdf)

Technology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that are as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than— those held by any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore. Failing nation-states—like North Korea—which possess nuclear weapons potentially pose a nuclear threat. Each new entrant to the nuclear club increases the possibility this will happen, but this problem is an old one, and one that existing diplomatic and military structures aim to manage. The newer and less understood danger arises from the increasing likelihood that stateless groups, bent on terrorism, will gain access to nuclear weapons, most likely by theft from a nation-state. Should this happen, the danger we now perceive to be coming from rogue states will pale in comparison. The ultimate response to a nuclear attack is a nuclear counterattack. Nation states have an address, and they know that we will retaliate in kind. Stateless groups are much more difficult to find which makes a nuclear counterattack virtually impossible. As a result, they can strike without fear of overwhelming retaliation, and thus they wield much more effective destructive power. Indeed, in many cases the fundamental equation of retaliation has become reversed. Terrorists often hope to provoke reprisal attacks on their own people, swaying popular opinion in their favor. The aftermath of 9/11 is a case in point. While it seems likely that Osama bin Laden and his henchmen hoped for a massive overreaction from the United States, it is unlikely his Taliban hosts anticipated the U.S. would go so far as to invade Afghanistan. Yes, al-Qaeda lost its host state and some personnel. The damage slowed the organization down but did not destroy it. Instead, the stateless al-Qaeda survived and adapted. The United States can claim some success against al-Qaeda in the years since 9/11, but it has hardly delivered a deathblow. Eventually, the world will recognize that stateless groups are more powerful than nation-states because terrorists can wield weapons and mount assaults that no nationstate would dare to attempt. So far, they have limited themselves to dramatic tactical terrorism: events such as 9/11, the butchering of Russian schoolchildren, decapitations broadcast over the internet, and bombings in major cities. Strategic objectives cannot be far behind.

### DA – China War

Soft power is seen as overreach by China. **Dynon 13**

Nicholas Dynon (Phd candidate in International Communication at Macquarie University, Sydney. His research explores the prospects for Chinese public diplomacy through an analysis of China Daily and People's Daily reportage of the 2008 Lhasa riots and Wenchuan earthquake in the critical period leading up to the Beijing Olympic Games. He is coordinator of the Line 21 Project, an online resource on Chinese state propaganda and public diplomacy. Having previously worked for the Australian Government’s Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Nicholas has served diplomatic postings in Shanghai, Beijing and the Fiji Islands. Most recently he worked in Australia’s Parliament House as a departmental liaison officer to the Immigration Minister. A graduate of the Australian National University (ANU) and the Royal Military College of Australia, he holds postgraduate degrees from the ANU and the University of Sydney. He writes for a number of publications on soft power, nation branding and internet governance, and his peer-reviewed research has appeared in The China Journal and Place Branding and Public Diplomacy.), Soft Power: A U.S.-China Battleground?, The Diplomat, 2013. NS

In a recent opinion piece for the Global Times, Professor Liu Aming of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of International Relations writes that soft power “is a kind of power which can also make enemies.” At first glance, Liu’s comment is a curious one: how can a power that aims to attract rather than coerce also be a power that makes enemies? Strip away the ostensibly benign surface of public diplomacy, cultural exchanges and language instruction, and it becomes clear that the U.S. and China are engaged in a soft power conflagration – a protracted cultural cold war. On one side bristles incumbent Western values hegemon, the U.S. On the other is China, one of the non-Western civilizations that Samuel Huntington noted back in 1993 “increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.” But to shape the world in non-Western ways means engaging in a soft power battlespace against an incumbent who already holds the high ground. Liu comments that in regions deeply influenced by Western cultures, political systems and values, the “latecomer” China is considered a “dissident force." Under such circumstances, “it is rather difficult for China to attract Western countries with its own political and cultural charisma, let alone to replace their positions.” According to this and similar viewpoints, China’s difficulty in projecting soft power across the world is in part due to the way the U.S. leverages its own soft power. Wu Jianmin, the former president of China’s Foreign Affairs University, puts the point well when explaining that U.S. soft power is driven by the imperative of “maintaining US hegemony in changing the world, of letting the world listen to the United States.” Thus, the state of global post-colonial, post-communist ideational hegemony is such that large swathes of the earth’s population see the world through lenses supplied by the West. Through these lenses, perceptions of China are dominated by such concepts as the “China threat theory,” which portrays China as a malevolent superpower upstart. But it’s actually inside China’s borders where the soft power struggle between China and the U.S. is most prominent. Official pronouncements from Chinese leaders have long played up the notion that Western culture is an aggressive threat to China’s own cultural sovereignty. It has thus taken myriad internal measures to ensure the country’s post-Mao reforms remain an exercise in modernization without “westernization.” Since the 1990s, for example, ideological doctrine has been increasingly infused with a new cultural nationalism, and the Party’s previously archaic propaganda system has been massively overhauled and working harder than ever.

Continued U.S hegemony will inevitably cause U.S - China war. **Layne 12**

Layne 12 ( Christopher, professor of international affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security. Excerpt from "This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana". Published by International Studies Quarterly, March 2012. wiley online library) JA

Great power politics is about power. Rules and institutions do not exist in vacuum. Rather, they reflect the distribution of power in the international system. In international politics, who rules makes the rules. The post-World War II international orde**r** is an American order that privileges the United States’ interests. Even the discourse of “liberal order” cannot conceal this fact. This is why the notion that China can be constrained by integrating into the post-1945 international order lacks credulity. For US scholars and policymakers alike, China’s successful integration hinges on Beijing’s willingness to accept the Pax Americana’s institutions, rules, and norms. In other words, China must accept playing second fiddle to the United States. Revealingly, Ikenberry makes clear this expectation when he says that the deal the United States should propose to China is for Washington “to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia” (Ikenberry 2011:356). It is easy to see why the United States would want to cut such a deal but it is hard to see what’s in it for China. American hegemony is waning and China is ascending, and there is zero reason for China to accept this bargain because it aims to be the hegemon in its own region. The unfolding Sino-American rivalry in East Asia can be seen as an example of Dodge City syndrome (in American Western movies, one gunslinger says to the other: “This town ain’t big enough for both of us”) or as a geopolitical example of Newtonian physics (two hegemons cannot occupy the same region at the same time). From either perspective, the dangers should be obvious: unless the United States is willing to accept China’s ascendancy in East (and Southeast) Asia, Washington and Beijing are on a collision course.

US-China war will go nuclear and leads to extinction. **Straits Times 2k**

Straits Times 2k [“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” June 25, 2000, Lexis]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into **a full-scale war between the US and China**. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale **would embroil other countries far and near and** -- horror of horrors -- **raise the possibility of** a **nuclear war.** Beijinghas already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, **east Asia will be set on fire**. **And** the conflagration may not end there as **opportunistic powers elsewhere may** try to **overturn the existing world order.** With the US distracted,Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape**. The balance of power in the Mid**dle **East may be similarly upset** by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, **hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase.** Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China50 years later, shortof **using** nuclearweapons**.** The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinesemilitary officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclearweapons mandatory **if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention.** Gen Ridgeway said that **should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization.** There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

### A2 ATT

We already signed this. **Hawkins 15**

AWR Hawkins, Obama Officials Heading to Mexico to Discuss International Gun Control Via UN Treaty, 23 Aug 2015

The ATT was signed by Secretary of State John Kerry on September 25, 2013 but never ratified by the US Senate. Nevertheless, Gun Owners of America reports that Obama officials will be in Mexico City for the conference. Breitbart News previously reported that the ATT is an international gun control treaty designed to be implemented apart from, or in spite of, the general framework of governance for countries that are signatories to it. Thus, while it will not do away with the Second Amendment on paper, it will subjugate the Second Amendment to the ATT’s gun controls if Obama administration officials return and implement the plans they will discuss in Mexico City. ATT was pushed under the guise of stopping “small arms [and] light weapons” from crossing borders. And when it was being discussed in 2013, Breitbart News warned that firearm registration must proceed from the ATT if it is to be enforceable. After all, how can agents tasked with enforcing this treaty ascertain the origin of smuggled weapons without a comprehensive registration on file? Moreover, the NRA pointed out that the treaty all but calls for a registry from the start inasmuch as it requires “importing countries to provide information to an exporting country regarding arms transfers, including ‘end use or end user documentation’ for a ‘minimum of ten years.’” This information on “end users” is not only a de-facto international gun registry but one that could be “made available to foreign governments.” Because of all these troubling aspects of ATT, Gun Owners of America (GOA) warns that the Mexico City conference is part of a plan “to bring back the framework for a global gun control regime.” GOA encourages every gun owner to call his or her US Senator and ask that they stand strong against any international gun control recommendations or regulations that the Obama administration pushes after the August 24 ATT conference.

## A2 Federalism

### Seperatism

Federalism sparks ethnic conflict. **Mutunga 01**

Willy Mutunga, Executive Director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, The Nation, May 20, 2001.

Federalism promotes localism, ethnic and racial xenophobia and undermines the sense of nationhood. Unsurprising the United States and Nigeria are living survivors of debilitating separatist wars between their regions; India, despite its federal miracle still bleeds from secessionist movements. The introduction of ethnic-based 'quasi-regionalism' in post-Mengistu Ethiopia has fuelled the conflict over the proposed Oromia state by members of the Oromo ethnic population. Majimboism in the early 1960s had let off the lid of secessionist movements, particularly by Kenyan Somalis in North Eastern Province and the clamour for an autonomous "Mwambao" on the Coast. There is no guarantee that this time around, majimboism will not trigger ethnic recidivism and separatist movements, especially in North Eastern, Coast and Eastern province where the Oromo population may lean towards the movement for an Oromia state. Federalism's main weakness is that it is a very expensive system that duplicates services and office holders at the regional and federal levels. It lacks uniform policies on such issues of national concern as laws regulating marriages, divorce, abortions, liquor, voting rights and public education. Rather than ensuring economic equity, as many proponents of majimboism assume, it sets those regions, states or cantons with a weak market-base, capital, and resources down the spiral of economic decline. It subjects local governments to double subordination-by the central and regional governments-and the citizens to triple taxation. At a time when the country's economy is on its knees, the feasibility of a well-financed transition is highly doubtful.

### Nuclear Power Shell

Strong adherence to federal environmental standards key to the nuclear power industry. **Chapa 15**

Sergio Chapa, 6/8/2015, San Antonio Business Journal, “Are new EPA regulations an opportunity for nuclear energy?” http://www.bizjournals.com/sanantonio/news/2015/06/08/are-new-epa-regulations-an-opportunity-for-nuclear.html

The Environmental Protection Agency is expected to toughen the nation's air pollution standards in the fall giving nuclear energy a possible opportunity to grow in the United States.¶ Hundreds of nuclear energy professionals are gathering at the Grand Hyatt in downtown San Antonio for the American Nuclear Society's annual meeting all this week.¶ The conference comes at time when the EPA is considering lowering ground-level ozone standards from 84 parts per billion to between 65 and 70 parts per billion forcing many American cities, including San Antonio, to look at ways to reduce emissions before they affect permitting for new businesses.¶ Participants at the conference's opening plenary said renewables such as wind and solar energy are not practical in many areas of the United States but nuclear energy dramatically reduces emissions and delivers clean, reliable, safe and affordable power but faces immense regulatory hurdles and a negative public image.¶ With two coal-fired plants, San Antonio's municipally-owned utility company CPS Energy is the number one contributor to the region's ground-level ozone in the region.¶ CPS Energy CEO Doyle Beneby told conference attendees that the utility company remains committed to its 40 percent stake in the South Texas Nuclear Project near Bay City. The nuclear power plant currently produces around one-third of CPS Energy's total electricity.¶ With a planned investment of close to $400 million, CPS Energy plans to be a 7.625 percent stakeholder in two more nuclear reactors that will be built on the site.¶ Beneby told attendees world leaders want to eliminate the use of all fossil fuels by the year 2100 leading CPS Energy and others to look at a nuclear energy solution.¶ "Clearly, nuclear will play an important role in the energy dynamic of the United States going forward," Beneby said.

Nuclear power solves warming and prevents extinction. **Lewis 07**

Matthew Lewis, Winter 2007, Issues in Science and Technology, “Book review: The End is Near,” http://issues.org/23-2/br\_lewis-10/

At age 87, James Lovelock remains the indefatigable proponent of the Gaia hypothesis, which depicts Earth as a living entity. In The Revenge of Gaia, he warns that Gaia is not well. Earth is running a worrisome fever, and unless drastic action is taken immediately, the coming heat wave will prove catastrophic. By the end of the century, Lovelock fears, humanity will be reduced to a small fraction of its current size, largely limited to arctic and polar refuges.¶ Lovelock’s warnings are rather apocalyptic but hardly exceptional. Almost all environmental scientists worry about global warming, and for good reason. Lovelock’s prescription for avoiding collapse, on the other hand, is rarely encountered. The only thing that can save the world, he vigorously argues, is nuclear power.

### Localism Shell

Federalism reduces local control --- strong national power strengthens it. **Cross 02**

(Frank, Former NDT Champ and Prof Law – U Texas Law, Cardozo Law Review, November, Lexis)

The evidence is overwhelming that federalism reduces localism. These robust findings survive the application of different independent variables, different measures of local expenditure, and different national samples. Thus, the interposition of sovereign state governments may reduce the central government's absolute role, but it will also significantly reduce the role of local government, which is the key to decentralized decisionmaking. 270 This finding is not an artifact of the particular time period chosen. Other OECD evidence "for four different time periods ... indicates that unitary countries spent about 60 percent more money at the municipal level than did federal countries." 271 Stephen Calabresi has dismissed the decentralization of unitary systems as merely "a matter of temporary national legislative grace." 272 Vicki Jackson notes that, without judicially-enforced federalism, the national government might "simply reorganize the political boundaries" of the states. 273 While this is technically true, in a formalistic sense, it has no pragmatic materiality. The virtues of decentralization are associated with actual decentralization, not constitutional guarantees. Institutional pragmatic pressures may be far more important than paper guarantees in ensuring decentralization. 274 Jackson concedes that it is unlikely that the national government would in fact abolish the states but claims that "the belief that it cannot happen (under the present Constitution) in broad ways frames a host of other understandings." 275 Surely this is overly formalistic; understandings are framed by real-world circumstances, not by admittedly unrealistic hypotheticals. If the national government faces compelling democratic pressure to delegate, such pressure may be far more significant than any formalistic legal paper guarantees. Moreover, true decentralization, to local governments, in a federal system is merely a matter of temporary state legislative grace. Neither unitary nor federal systems truly [\*51] guarantee much real decentralization, but the circumstances of unitary systems conduce to a greater overall level of decentralization. Indeed, the international evidence suggests that federalism and decentralization function at cross purposes. 276

This internal link turns their impact – they kill effective enforcement and cooperation. **Cross 02**

(Frank, Former NDT Champ and Prof Law – U Texas Law, Cardozo Law Review, November, Lexis)

Federalism is a structural feature of the American political system. The federal system in this nation will not disappear in light of evidence that it is inferior to a more unitary system. 317 If federalism is only a "historical artifact," 318 though, it hardly offers grounds for its vigorous enforcement by the Supreme Court or other institutions. 319 The relevant issue regards what we shall make of this historical artifact and how it might be adapted, within the bounds of the Constitution, for the benefit of the nation. The benefits of decentralization not only fail to justify an expansive defense of states' rights, they affirmatively counsel against such an interpretation of the constitution. As more power is transferred from the national government to the states, so will authority be drawn from localities to the more centralized states and governmental quality and societal welfare will suffer. Fortunately, it appears unlikely that the Supreme Court will substantially reinvigorate American federalism. 320 Historically, "the less politically significant the issue, the greater the Court's insistence on the virtues of federalism." 321 The structural features of the Court make it unlikely that federalism jurisprudence will ever become too aggressive. 322 On the margin, however, the current Court clearly intends to strengthen state sovereignty and limit the discretion of the federal government in favor of that of the states. Those decisions have been defended and justified as prudential ones, preserving the virtues of decentralized decisionmaking. This defense is grounded in speculation and symbolism, though, and lacks truth. We have a federal system in this nation, for better or worse. Despite its federalism, the United States is a relatively [\*59] decentralized nation, with reasonably good governance and no severe corruption problem. Our beneficial situation cannot plausibly be attributed to our federal system itself, though, given the empirical evidence. Consequently, the mere pious invocation of federalism and its values of decentralization and good governance, which has become common among academic commentators and even judges, provides no real support for any particular decisions in support of states' rights. Rather, any such decisions about federalism, whether judicial, legislative, or executive, should be grounded in a pragmatic assessment of their consequences. Dedication to preservation and empowerment of state sovereignty, in its own intrinsic right, is insupportable, and the presumption should be to the contrary.

### Biodiversity Shell

Federalism undermines biodiversity – resistance from local citizens and governments proves. **Tarlock 95**

Tarlock, Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College of Law, 95 [A. Dan, Md. L. Rev. 1315, Summer, p. Lexis]

Federalism doctrines may undermine biodiversity for both ethical and practical reasons because they unduly check national authority. Biodiversity protection is more the province of national elites than local citizens and runs counter to the often expressed preferences for lower-level rather than higher-level political control for the use of private property claims to block environmental regulation. The fact that biodiversity is frustrated by lower-level resistance is, of course, not in and of itself a basis for criticizing a constitutionally derived doctrine. However, biodiversity protection may provide a new interest for courts to consider in federalism and constitutional adjudication when no other compelling constitutional values are at stake. The root of the problem is the preference for local decision-making that runs through much federalism jurisprudence. This preference can frustrate biodiversity because it concentrates power at the level where opposition to biodiversity protection may be the strongest. The preference for local decision-making rests on an alternative vision of the virtues of America as a confederation of city-states, coexisting with the Marshallian vision of a strong central government curbing parochial tendencies. Professor Carol Rose finds the persistence "of stubborn local particularism" a logical "evolution of a kind of Anti-Federalist praxis, almost invisible in an intellectual environment of overwhelming Federalist theory." 109 Biodiversity protection is especially vulnerable to this form of localism because it is both a novel and thus difficult theoretical, legal, and political problem.

Loss of biodiversity causes extinction. **Science Daily 11**

(Citing Prof Michel Loreau, PhD Ecologist, and Prof Michael Scherer-Lorenzen, PhD and Professor @ University of Freiburg, " Biodiversity Key to Earth's Life-Support Functions in a Changing World," Aug 11, <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/08/110811084513.htm>)

ScienceDaily (Aug. 11, 2011) — The biological diversity of organisms on Earth is not just something we enjoy when taking a walk through a blossoming meadow in spring; it **is** also **the basis** for countless products and services provided by nature, including food, building materials, and medicines as well as the self-purifying qualities of water and protection against erosion. **These** so-called ecosystem services are what makes Earth inhabitable for humans. They are based on ecological processes, such as photosynthesis, the production of biomass, or nutrient cycles. Since biodiversity is on the decline, both on a global and a local scale, researchers are asking the question as to what role the diversity of organisms plays in maintaining these ecological processes and thus in providing the ecosystem's vital products and services. In **an** international research group led by Prof. Dr. Michel Loreau from Canada, ecologists from ten different universities and research institutes, including Prof. Dr. Michael Scherer-Lorenzen from the University of Freiburg, compiled findings from numerous biodiversity experiments and reanalyzed them. These experiments simulated the loss of plant species and attempted to determine the consequences for the functioning of ecosystems, most of them coming to the conclusion that a higher level of biodiversity is accompanied by an increase in ecosystem processes. However, the findings were always only valid for a certain combination of environmental conditions present at the locations at which the experiments were conducted and for a limited range of ecosystem processes. In a study published in the current issue of the journal Nature, the research group investigated the extent to which the positive effects of diversity still apply under changing environmental conditions and when a multitude of processes are taken into account. They **found that** 84 percent of the 147 plant species included in the experiments promoted ecological processes in at least one case. The more years, locations, ecosystem processes, and scenarios of global change -- such as global warming or land use intensity -- the experiments took into account, the more plant species were necessary to guarantee the functioning of the ecosystems. Moreover, other **species were always necessary to keep the ecosystem processes runnin**g under the different combinations of influencing factors. These findings indicate that much more **biodiversity** is necessary to keep ecosystems functioning in a world that is changing ever faster. The protection of diversity is thus a crucial factor in maintaining Earth's life-support functions.

### Warming

Asia pollution offsets any US action – global warming is inevitable. **Knappenberger 12**

Mr. Paul Knappenberger is the Assistant Director of the Cato Institute’s Center for the Study of Science. He holds an M.S. degree in Environmental Sciences (1990) from the University of Virginia as well as a B.A. degree in Environmental Sciences (1986) from the same institution.His over 20 years of experience as a climate researcher have included 10 years with the Virginia State Climatology Office and 13 years with New Hope Environmental Services, Inc. June 7th, 2012, "Asian Air Pollution Warms U.S More than Our GHG Emissions (More futility for U.S. EPA)" www.masterresource.org/2012/06/asian-air-pollution-warming/

“The whims of foreign nations, not to mention Mother Nature, can completely offset any climate changes induced by U.S. greenhouse gas emissions reductions…. So, what’s the point of forcing Americans into different energy choices?”¶ A new study provides evidence that air pollution emanating from Asia will warm the U.S. as much or more than warming from U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The implication? **Efforts by the** U.S. **Environmental Protection Agency** (and otherwise) **to mitigate anthropogenic** climate change is moot.¶ If the future temperature rise in the U.S. is subject to the whims of Asian environmental and energy policy, then what sense does it make for Americans to have their energy choices regulated by efforts aimed at mitigating future temperature increases across the country—efforts which will have less of an impact on temperatures than the policies enacted across Asia?¶ Maybe **the EPA should reconsider the perceived effectiveness of its greenhouse gas emission regulations**—at least when it comes to impacting temperatures across the U.S.¶ New Study¶ A new study just published in the scientific journal Geophysical Research Letters is authored by a team led by Haiyan Teng from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, in Boulder, Colorado. The paper is titled “Potential Impacts of Asian Carbon Aerosols on Future US Warming.”¶ Skipping the details of this climate modeling study and cutting to the chase, here is the abstract of the paper:¶ This study uses an atmosphere-ocean fully coupled climate model to investigate possible remote impacts of Asian carbonaceous aerosols on US climate change. We took a 21st century mitigation scenario as a reference, and carried out three sets of sensitivity experiments in which the prescribed carbonaceous aerosol concentrations over a selected Asian domain are increased by a factor of two, six, and ten respectively during the period of 2005–2024.¶ The resulting enhancement of atmospheric **solar absorption** (only the direct effect of aerosols is included) **over Asia induces** tropospheric heating anomalies that force large-scale circulation changes which, averaged over the twenty-year period, **add as much as** an additional 0.4°C warming **over the eastern US during winter** and over most of the US during summer. Such remote impacts are confirmed by an atmosphere stand-alone experiment with specified heating anomalies over Asia that represent the direct effect of the carbon aerosols.¶ Usually, when considering the climate impact from carbon aerosol emissions (primarily in the form of black carbon, or soot), the effect is thought to be largely contained to the local or regional scale because the atmospheric lifetime of these particulates is only on the order of a week (before they are rained out). Since Asia lies on the far side of the Pacific Ocean—a distance which requires about a week for air masses to navigate—we usually aren’t overly concerned about the quality of Asian air or the quantity of junk that they emit into it. By the time it gets here, it has largely been naturally scrubbed clean.¶ But in the Teng et al. study, the authors find that, according to their climate model, the local heating of the atmosphere by the **Asian carbon aerosols** (which are quite good at absorbing sunlight) can **impart changes to the character of the larger-scale atmospheric circulation patterns.** And these changes to the broader atmospheric flow produce an effect on the weather patterns in the U.S. and thus induce a change in the climate here characterized by “0.4°C [surface air temperature] warming on average over the eastern US during winter and over almost the entire US during summer” averaged over the 2005–2024 period.¶ While most of the summer warming doesn’t start to kick in until Asian carbonaceous aerosol emissions are upped in the model to 10 times what they are today, the winter warming over the eastern half of the country is large (several tenths of a °C) even at twice the current rate of Asian emissions.¶ Now let’s revisit just how much “global warming” that stringent U.S. greenhouse gas emissions reductions may avoid averaged across the country.¶ In my Master Resource post “Climate Impacts of Waxman-Markey (the IPCC-based arithmetic of no gain)” I calculated that a more than 80% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. by the year 2050 would result in a reduction of global temperatures (from where they otherwise would be) of about 0.05°C. Since the U.S. is projected to warm slightly more than the global average (land warms faster than the oceans), a 0.05°C of global temperature reduction probably amounts to about 0.075°C of temperature “savings” averaged across the U.S., by the year 2050.¶ Comparing the amount of warming in the U.S. saved by reducing our greenhouse gas emissions by some 80% to the amount of warming added in the U.S. by increases in Asian black carbon (soot) aerosol emissions (at least according to Teng et al.) and there is no clear winner. Which points out the anemic effect that U.S. greenhouse gas reductions will have on the climate of the U.S. and **just how easily the whims of foreign nations, not to mention Mother Nature, can completely offset any climate changes induced by our greenhouse gas emissions reductions**.¶ And even if the traditional form of air pollution (e.g., soot) does not increase across Asia (a slim chance of that), greenhouse gases emitted there certainly will. For example, at the current growth rate, new greenhouse gas emissions from China will completely subsume an 80% reduction in U.S. greenhouse gas emission in just over a decade. Once again, pointing out that a reduction in domestic greenhouse gases is for naught, at least when it comes to mitigating climate change.¶ So, what’s the point, really, of forcing Americans into different energy choices? As I have repeatedly pointed out, nothing we do here (when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions) will make any difference either domestically, or globally, when it comes to influences on the climate. What the powers-that-be behind emissions reduction schemes in the U.S. are hoping for is that 1) it doesn’t hurt us too much, and 2) that China and other large developing nations will follow our lead.¶ Both outcomes seem dubious at time scales that make a difference.

Warming does not cause extinction – their models are flawed. **Stockwell 11**

David Stockwell 11, Researcher at the San Diego Supercomputer Center, Ph.D. in Ecosystem Dynamics from the Australian National University, developed the Genetic Algorithm for Rule-set Production system making contributions modeling of invasive species, epidemiology of human diseases, the discovery of new species, and effects on species of climate change, April 21, 2011, “Errors of Global Warming Effects Modeling,” online: <http://landshape.org/enm/errors-of-global-warming-effects-modeling/>

Predictions of massive species extinctions due to AGW came into prominence with a January 2004 paper in Nature called Extinction Risk from Climate Change by Chris Thomas et al.. They made the following predictions: ¶ “we predict, on the basis of mid-range climate-warming scenarios for 2050, that 15â€“37% of species in our sample of regions and taxa will be â€˜committed to extinctionâ€™.¶ Subsequently, three communications appeared in Nature in July 2004. Two raised technical problems, including one by the eminent ecologist Joan Roughgarden. Opinions raged from “Dangers of Crying Wolf over Risk of Extinctions” concerned with damage to conservationism by alarmism, through poorly written press releases by the scientists themselves, and Extinction risk [press] coverage is worth the inaccuracies stating “we believe the benefits of the wide release greatly outweighed the negative effects of errors in reporting”.¶ Among those believing gross scientific inaccuracies are not justified, and such attitudes diminish the standing of scientists, I was invited to a meeting of a multidisciplinary group of 19 scientists, including Dan Bodkin from UC Santa Barbara, mathematician Matt Sobel, Craig Loehle and others at the Copenhagen base of BjÃ¸rn Lomborg, author of The Skeptical Environmentalist. This resulted in Forecasting the Effects of Global Warming on Biodiversity published in 2007 BioScience. We were particularly concerned by the cavalier attitude to model validations in the Thomas paper, and the field in general: ¶ Of the modeling papers we have reviewed, only a few were validated. Commonly, these papers simply correlate present distribution of species with climate variables, then replot the climate for the future from a climate model and, finally, use one-to-one mapping to replot the future distribution of the species, without any validation using independent data. Although some are clear about some of their assumptions (mainly equilibrium assumptions), readers who are not experts in modeling can easily misinterpret the results as valid and validated. For example, Hitz and Smith (2004) discuss many possible effects of global warming on the basis of a review of modeling papers, and in this kind of analysis the unvalidated assumptions of models would most likely be ignored.¶ The paper observed that few mass extinctions have been seen over recent rapid climate changes, suggesting something must be wrong with the models to get such high rates of extinctions. They speculated that species may survive in refugia, suitable habitats below the spatial scale of the models.¶ Another example of an unvalidated assumptions that could bias results in the direction of extinctions, was described in chapter 7 of my book Niche Modeling.¶ When climate change shifts a species’ niche over a landscape (dashed to solid circle) the response of that species can be described in three ways: dispersing to the new range (migration), local extirpation (intersection), or expansion (union). Given the probability of extinction is correlated with range size, there will either be no change, an increase (intersection), or decrease (union) in extinctions depending on the dispersal type. Thomas et al. failed to consider range expansion (union), a behavior that predominates in many groups. Consequently, the methodology was inherently biased towards extinctions.¶ One of the many errors in this work was a failure to evaluate the impact of such assumptions.¶ The prevailing view now, according to Stephen Williams, coauthor of the Thomas paper and Director for the Center for Tropical Biodiversity and Climate Change, and author of such classics as “Climate change in Australian tropical rainforests: an impending environmental catastrophe”, may be here.¶ Many unknowns remain in projecting extinctions, and the values provided in Thomas et al. (2004) should not be taken as precise predictions. … Despite these uncertainties, Thomas et al. (2004) believe that the consistent overall conclusions across analyses establish that anthropogenic climate warming at least ranks alongside other recognized threats to global biodiversity. ¶ So how precise are the figures? Williams suggests we should just trust the beliefs of Thomas et al. — an approach referred to disparagingly in the forecasting literature as a judgmental forecast rather than a scientific forecast (Green & Armstrong 2007). These simple models gloss over numerous problems in validating extinction models, including the propensity of so-called extinct species quite often reappear. Usually they are small, hard to find and no-one is really looking for them.

Warming doesn’t lead to extinction—no data. **Bastasch 14**

(Michael, 3/24/14, The Daily Caller, “IPCC runs from claims that global warming will cause mass extinctions,” http://dailycaller.com/2014/03/24/ipcc-runs-from-claims-that-global-warming-will-cause-mass-extinctions/, 6/27/14

The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is distancing itself from past claims that global warming could cause mass extinctions.¶ A leaked IPCC draft report says that there is “very little confidence that the models currently predict accurately the risk of extinction.”¶ The leaked report, obtained by Germany’s Der Spiegel newspaper, says that an “acute lack of data” have added to doubts over past claims made by climate scientists of mass extinctions in the future. “Biological findings have increased doubt over the expected species extinction,” says the IPCC.¶ In its 2007 climate assessment, the IPCC said that there was a “medium confidence” that 20 to 30 percent of plant and animal species were at risk of going extinct if global temperatures rose between 1.5 and 2.5 degrees Celsius this century. If temperatures rose by 3.5 degrees Celsius the IPCC predicted “significant extinctions” would occur — between 40 and 70 percent of species.¶ Environmental groups have also warned of mass extinctions due to global warming. The Nature Conservancy says that “one-fourth of Earth’s species will be headed for extinction by 2050 if the warming trend continues at its current rate.” The group adds that “polar bears may be gone from the planet in as little as 100 years and that several “U.S. states may even lose their official birds as they head for cooler climates — including the Baltimore oriole of Maryland, black-capped chickadee of Massachusetts, and the American goldfinch of Iowa.”¶ But Der Spiegel reports that the IPCC is shying away from such claims and gives no concrete numbers for how many plant and animal species could be at risk if global temperatures increased.¶

## A2 HR Cred

### ICC CP

The United States federal government should cooperate with the International Criminal Court without ratifying the Rome Statute.

Solves the human right’s cred advantage. **Dietrich 11**

(John W, Bryant University, “Time for the United States to Cooperate with the ICC”, <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=31374>)

Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg argue that the United States should move to a policy of cooperation with the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a means of reaching the established U.S. goal of seeing gross violators of human rights and perpetrators of mass atrocities held accountable for their actions. U.S. cooperation also would please allies and be morally right. The authors move discussion of the ICC away from the well-worn theoretical debates on the merits of global governance and proper limitations on sovereignty to, first, the broader issue of how the United States works for international justice and, second, the practical question of whether cooperation with the ICC advances U.S. interests. Such intellectual moves force U.S. critics of the ICC into the difficult position of either questioning the merits of the U.S. goal of international justice or showing that this goal could be better achieved through other policies.¶ Feinstein and Lindberg also later add a third shift in the debate by suggesting that the issue should not be defined only as a choice of either U.S. opposition to the ICC or ratification of the Rome Statute, but should include a middle option of U.S. cooperation with the court without ratification, at least at this point. Cooperation would give the United States many of the benefits of joining the ICC without subjecting itself to the court’s jurisdiction or requiring Senate approval.¶ Overall, the book raises an interesting perspective and advances many practical policy steps. Several of the latter have already been adopted by Barack Obama’s administration. ICC critics, though, are likely to be less willing than the authors to move away from theoretical debates or to see the ICC’s actions to date in positive terms. How long the United States could, or should, remain with the middle policy of cooperation without ratification also remains unclear.¶ Feinstein was at the Brookings Institution and has worked with notable Democratic politicians. Lindberg is at the Hoover Institution and has worked with key Republican politicians. Both have spent extensive time in Washington policy circles. They intend this work to be similar to other recent bipartisan efforts to assess in practical terms how U.S. interests can be furthered by international institutions. Their background and goal gives the book a different set of arguments and writing style when compared to works on the ICC by academics or lawyers.

## A2 Latin American Relations

### Defense

Their link evidence is very specific that assault weapons are what’s being trafficked, not handguns – also proves alt cause. **Sweig 13**

Sweig 13 Julia E. Sweig (Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies) “A Strategy to Reduce Gun Trafficking and Violence in the Americas” Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 36 July 2013 http://www.cfr.org/arms-industries-and-trade/strategy-reduce-gun-trafficking-violence-americas/p31155 EE

The flow of high-powered weaponry from the United States to Latin America and the Caribbean exacerbates soaring rates of gun-related violence in the region and undermines U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere. Though the Senate rejected measures to expand background checks on firearms sales, reinstate a federal assault-weapons ban, and make straw purchasing a federal crime, the Obama administration can still take executive action to reduce the availability and trafficking of assault weapons and ammunition in the Americas.

Perception based links are non-unique or empirically denied – Obama’s XO means the US is already perceived as having taken action for guns

US-Latin American relations are improving – their alarmism is what makes relations break down in the first place. **Weeks 14**

Gregory Weeks, Is the US 'losing' Latin America?, September 4, 2014 EE

The assertion that the United States is "losing" Latin America is a persistent and bipartisan obsession. In an era of intense domestic polarisation, analysts - especially in the United States but elsewhere as well - of all different political stripes seem to find agreement. This line of reasoning gathered steam in the past decade in large part because of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's rise to power. It is a straightforward and tempting thesis, but it is also inaccurate and fosters problematic directions for US foreign policy. The basic argument goes like this: Presidents George W Bush and Barack Obama alike have focused on other parts of the world, primarily the Middle East. They have therefore responded to events in this hemisphere in a reactive and insufficient manner which allows adversaries - Venezuelans, Cubans, Chinese, Russians, Iranians, Hamas, among others - to throw their political weight around. The "losing" thus refers to a perceived loss of influence on a major scale. Some consider the trend positive because, they say, Latin American countries are enjoying more sovereignty. Others believe it to be negative because it entails a threat to US security. The argument is so pervasive that it has reached the level of conventional wisdom. The problem, though, is that evidence is hard to come by. The thousands of articles on the topic make reference to a variety of signs, but very rarely specify how they correlate to a substantive loss of US influence. Viewfinder - Latin America: Cuba Calling So, for example, it should not be about Venezuela. A common argument is that President Hugo Chavez, and then to a lesser extent his successor Nicolas Maduro, would spread their "21st century socialist" ideology to other countries. This most recently came from Nobel Prize winner Mario Vargas Llosa. In fact, around Latin America few leaders have shown more than superficial interest in copying either Chavez's political or economic models, while Venezuelan foreign policy influence remains limited to the relatively few countries to which it gives highly subsidised oil. The "loss" seems to refer primarily to the fact that Venezuela has any influence at all. It should not be about the creation of new regional institutions that exclude the United States. In practice, they have been quite weak, which greatly limits their influence. Summits and statements do not ipso facto translate to independence or power. They could well be more relevant in the future, but for now organisations like the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) are tied largely to Venezuelan oil largesse. Meanwhile, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) has more clout but its efforts at conflict resolution (such as in Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador) don't mark a sudden change. Costa Rican President Oscar Arias famously won a Nobel Prize for doing the same with Central America in the 1980s while leaving out a hostile US administration. Plus, in the most serious cases, such as the 2009 Honduran coup, Latin American leaders still tend to look to the US to help find collective solutions. It should not be about trade, which is booming and increasing annually. Plus, in recent years the US has a trade surplus with Latin America. Thirteen of seventeen Latin American countries import more goods from the US than from anywhere else. In 2014 the Department of Commerce unveiled a new plan to continue that trend by identifying trade opportunities in South America. Even Latin American governments that are publicly critical of the US very quietly continue to look northward for trade and investment. Therefore it's hard to see where any loss of influence would result. It should not be about China. A popular argument is that China is trading more with Latin America, thus decreasing the share of US trade, at times with dire forecasts about the trend continuing indefinitely. The conclusion is that the United States will not feel so at home in its "backyard". Yet the US remains the largest single source of foreign direct investment into Latin America. The economic presence of the US is still huge even with trade diversification. Most of the anxiety centres not on the present, but on a hypothetical future where China pressures Latin America to block US initiatives, such as in the United Nations. There's no evidence of that now, and it requires believing that Latin American independence is automatically robbed by other large countries. There is also a significant language barrier that does not exist with the US. It should not be about high-profile visits. Who the White House sends to an inauguration has no bearing on long-term relations, nor does the number of times a US president travels to the region. What matters far more are lower profile but critical engagements that occur on a daily basis but don't receive much media attention. Even more important slights, such as the wiretapping of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, caused a brief row followed by a statement that she did not blame President Obama and wished to resume normal relations. In short, the US isn't "losing" Latin America. Governments in the region do engage with more international actors than in the past, but US influence is still considerable. The alarmism (or celebration, depending on your ideological perspective) is misplaced. Reality is far less interesting, namely that the US-Latin American relationship has changed less than commonly believed, though it is slowly evolving in a way that involves greater (though by no means universal) acceptance of new regional institutions. This has important implications because the desire to reaffirm US influence contributes to unwise policy prescriptions based on the notion that the US government must once again assert itself. These include imposing sanctions on Venezuela, viewing China as an automatic threat, focusing excessively on claims of Middle Eastern terrorists in the region, and resisting engagement with Cuba. These responses actually worsen US relations in the region.The basic argument goes like this: Presidents George W Bush and Barack Obama alike have focused on other parts of the world, primarily the Middle East. They have therefore responded to events in this hemisphere in a reactive and insufficient manner which allows adversaries - Venezuelans, Cubans, Chinese, Russians, Iranians, Hamas, among others - to throw their political weight around. The "losing" thus refers to a perceived loss of influence on a major scale. Some consider the trend positive because, they say, Latin American countries are enjoying more sovereignty. Others believe it to be negative because it entails a threat to US security. The argument is so pervasive that it has reached the level of conventional wisdom. The problem, though, is that evidence is hard to come by. The thousands of articles on the topic make reference to a variety of signs, but very rarely specify how they correlate to a substantive loss of US influence. So, for example, it should not be about Venezuela. A common argument is that President Hugo Chavez, and then to a lesser extent his successor Nicolas Maduro, would spread their "21st century socialist" ideology to other countries. This most recently came from Nobel Prize winner Mario Vargas Llosa. In fact, around Latin America few leaders have shown more than superficial interest in copying either Chavez's political or economic models, while Venezuelan foreign policy influence remains limited to the relatively few countries to which it gives highly subsidised oil. The "loss" seems to refer primarily to the fact that Venezuela has any influence at all. It should not be about the creation of new regional institutions that exclude the United States. In practice, they have been quite weak, which greatly limits their influence. Summits and statements do not ipso facto translate to independence or power. They could well be more relevant in the future, but for now organisations like the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) are tied largely to Venezuelan oil largesse. Meanwhile, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) has more clout but its efforts at conflict resolution (such as in Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador) don't mark a sudden change. Costa Rican President Oscar Arias famously won a Nobel Prize for doing the same with Central America in the 1980s while leaving out a hostile US administration. Plus, in the most serious cases, such as the 2009 Honduran coup, Latin American leaders still tend to look to the US to help find collective solutions. It should not be about trade, which is booming and increasing annually. Plus, in recent years the US has a trade surplus with Latin America. Thirteen of seventeen Latin American countries import more goods from the US than from anywhere else. In 2014 the Department of Commerce unveiled a new plan to continue that trend by identifying trade opportunities in South America. Even Latin American governments that are publicly critical of the US very quietly continue to look northward for trade and investment. Therefore it's hard to see where any loss of influence would result. It should not be about China. A popular argument is that China is trading more with Latin America, thus decreasing the share of US trade, at times with dire forecasts about the trend continuing indefinitely. The conclusion is that the United States will not feel so at home in its "backyard". Yet the US remains the largest single source of foreign direct investment into Latin America. The economic presence of the US is still huge even with trade diversification. Most of the anxiety centres not on the present, but on a hypothetical future where China pressures Latin America to block US initiatives, such as in the United Nations. There's no evidence of that now, and it requires believing that Latin American independence is automatically robbed by other large countries. There is also a significant language barrier that does not exist with the US. It should not be about high-profile visits. Who the White House sends to an inauguration has no bearing on long-term relations, nor does the number of times a US president travels to the region. What matters far more are lower profile but critical engagements that occur on a daily basis but don't receive much media attention. Even more important slights, such as the wiretapping of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, caused a brief row followed by a statement that she did not blame President Obama and wished to resume normal relations. In short, the US isn't "losing" Latin America. Governments in the region do engage with more international actors than in the past, but US influence is still considerable. The alarmism (or celebration, depending on your ideological perspective) is misplaced. Reality is far less interesting, namely that the US-Latin American relationship has changed less than commonly believed, though it is slowly evolving in a way that involves greater (though by no means universal) acceptance of new regional institutions. This has important implications because the desire to reaffirm US influence contributes to unwise policy prescriptions based on the notion that the US government must once again assert itself. These include imposing sanctions on Venezuela, viewing China as an automatic threat, focusing excessively on claims of Middle Eastern terrorists in the region, and resisting engagement with Cuba. These responses actually worsen US relations in the region.

Squo solves – Obama administration recognized the problem and started fixing it after their ev was written. **Keck 4/6**

Jennifer Keck, Resetting U.S.-Latin America Relations, April 6 2016 EE

President Obama made headlines in March with his historic visit to Cuba, but his less sensational trip to Argentina may prove to be equally important in repairing U.S.-Latin America relations. The move to normalize relations with Cuba will no doubt become a central piece of the Obama legacy. However, it's only one aspect of the Administration's engagement with the region over the past two years, which has involved a strategic pivot from previous policies. It began in late 2013 when Secretary of State John Kerry proposed a new beginning during his speech to the Organization of American States, in which he declared that the Monroe Doctrine was "over." In the years since, inviting Latin America to the diplomatic table has already been a success. Throughout the region, left-wing policies are going by the wayside while global engagement and free markets are taking hold. And anti-American rhetoric is becoming less popular as leaders discover it's no longer the battle cry it once was. Ending the Cuban Embargo Obama's call to end the Cuban Embargo is certainly an important move toward a policy of partnership. For 50 years, the Castro regime blamed all of Cuba's economic woes on the U.S. From food shortages to unemployment, Cuba could always point to unfair foreign policies instead of looking inward at its unsustainable Communist system. But it's hard to denounce a U.S. president who says, "What we did for 50 years did not serve our interests or the interests of the Cuban people." It's harder still to denounce an administration that backs up this assertion by hosting diplomatic talks on trade, ocean conservation, and transnational crime. (Only Congress can lift the embargo.) Next Stop: Buenos Aires It's no surprise that Buenos Aires was Obama's next stop on his Latin America tour. Argentina's newly elected President Mauricio Macri has already started implementing new, fiscally responsible policies as he moves to reset foreign relations. The visit also held symbolic importance, with Obama apologizing for America's involvement in Argentina's Dirty War, the former military dictatorship's campaign against suspected left-wing opponents. Acknowledging how much damage past U.S. policies have caused in the region will go a long way to improve relations. U.S.-Latin American Relations 2.0 Strengthening ties is prudent for both Latin American and the United States. Over one billion dollars crosses the U.S.-Mexico border every day, making Latin America the fastest growing trading partner for the United States. But there's more to relations than trade. With over 55 million Latinos living in America, the line between Anglo and Latino cultures is quickly blurring. And the 585 million citizens of the region largely value a strong civil society, freedom of speech, and universal equality, proving that the U.S. has much in common with its southern neighbors. Today, relations are obvioulsy stronger in certain countries such as Colombia and Mexico. President Obama has already come out in support of Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos' commitment to ending the violent conflict with the FARC and is backing Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto’s ambitious structural reforms. Meanwhile, Obama has also been targeting the cause of mass immigration from Central America by offering substantial financial aid to help these countries combat violence, corruption, and a dire economic situation.

The article your internal link evidence is cut from doesn't say that general good standing is key, it says that a specific cooperative framework in the America’s solves your impacts – they literally say 1 silver bullet legislation isn’t what they’re talking about - Guns bans don’t get us any closer to their plan being implemented. **Brookings 08**

Brookings Institution 08 “Rethinking U.S.—Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World” Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, 2008 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24-latin-america-partnership/1124\_latin\_america\_partnership.PDF EE

This report does not advance a single, grand scheme for reinventing hemispheric relations. Instead, the report’s analyses are based on two simple propositions: The hemisphere’s countries share common interests; and the United States should engage its hemispheric neighbors on issues where shared interests, objectives, and solutions are easiest to identify and can serve as the basis for a sustainable partnership. In this spirit, the report offers a series of modest, pragmatic recommendations that, if implemented, could help the hemisphere’s countries manage key transnational challenges and realize the region’s potential. The concept of a hemispheric partnership holds most promise in four areas: (1) developing sustainable energy sources and mitigating climate change, (2) managing migration effectively, (3) expanding opportunities for all through economic integration, and (4) protecting the hemisphere from drug trafficking and organized crime. The next four sections of this report offer an analysis of each area and provide concrete recommendations for U.S. policymakers. The last section of the report addresses U.S. relations with Cuba. This issue is of a smaller order of magnitude than the issues of energy, migration, trade, and organized crime. But because Cuba has long been a subject of intense interest in U.S. foreign policy and a stumbling block for U.S. relations with the hemisphere’s other countries, the members of the Commission felt it necessary to address the issue here. The Mechanics of Partnership A common theme running through this report is the institutional infrastructure that will be necessary to sustain hemispheric cooperation. Rather than calling for new international organizations with lumbering bureaucracies, the report recommends that the hemisphere’s countries partner through lean, nimble networks based on the principle of “variable geometry”—the idea that not every country needs to take part in every policy initiative and discussion, but that some countries should cooperate more closely on certain issues. For example, the report calls for groups of varied sizes to coordinate policies and exchange information on adapting to climate change, carbon-emissions controls, migration issues, counternarcotics initiatives, and regional economic integration. At the top of this system might be an “Americas Eight” (A8), an umbrella grouping of eight heads of state from the hemisphere that would serve as a steering committee for the proposed partnership. Modeled on the Group of Eight, the A8 would set the agendas of issue-specific networks and encourage consensus building and political agreement at the highest levels of government. Though the question of the A8’s membership will clearly be controversial, at its core should be those countries with the largest populations and economies in the Americas, including Brazil, Mexico, and the United States, (see figure 1). The concept of an A8 is not developed further in this report, but it is offered here as a promising vehicle for a hemispheric partnership.